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2ABSTRACT
Robert Cover is known for having argued that in every plural society there exist, 
along with the State, multiple normative entities that create and maintain their own 
sense of normativity, that is, their own holistic modes of assessing good and bad, valid 
and invalid, right and wrong. Beyond that, few systematic attempts have been made to 
pursue this view as a comprehensive theory of law. The principal aim of this piece is to 
demonstrate that Cover offers a novel and viable paradigm of law, which must at least 
include an ontology (an understanding of the basic units and organizational structure of 
law), an epistemology (an account of legal knowledge, reasoning, and interpretation), an 
axiology (how legal value is created, assessed, and maintained), and a sociology (how 
law relates to and fits in the larger non-legal environment).  
I shall argue that such a paradigm is not only alternative to that of the most 
influential legal philosophers of the twentieth century, but offers a way out of many of 
their dilemmas. Among these, Cover’s view of the nomos provides a flexible structure 
which overcomes the shortcomings associated with the Kelsenian pyramid. It suggests a 
model for the identification of law that reveals the inadequacies—and compensates for 
the deficiencies—of the Hartian rule of recognition, and a justification for the role of the 
judiciary, which, unlike the Dworkinian Hercules, does not obliterate but builds upon 
the constraints of jurisdiction.  
My analysis is divided into four sections: In Part I, I speak of the nomos as an 
individual entity and disentangle the enigmatic, yet crucial concept of what it means to 
inhabit it. I will ask questions such as: What are the constitutive elements of the nomos?
3How is it structured? What forces impinge on it? Can the nomos be changed? Are there 
limits to the nomos? Incidentally, I will show that Cover opens up a bridge to cross the 
seemingly unbridgeable gap between is and ought, putting an end to the fruitless 
discussion between juspositivists and jusnaturalists over the relation between law and 
morality. Next, I will explain how normativity is constructed in connection to both 
commitment and objectification (I. 2), followed by an analysis of the typology 
distinctively employed by Cover, namely the paideic and the imperial ideal-types (I. 3). 
Part II takes a broader perspective to observe the plural normative space in which 
diverse nomic entities interact. Here, I analyze Cover’s distinction between insular and 
redemptive types, in connection to the process of constitutional meaning-formation. This 
section realistically elaborates upon the interconnectedness of the constitutional 
meaning, without presupposing, on the other hand, a (political) overlapping consensus.
Part III considers the distinct possibility of clashes among diverse nomic entities, which 
brings to the fore the context of adjudication. Here, Cover offers an innovative 
conceptualization of the when, why, what, and how of the so-called “hard cases.” This 
section culminates in a triadic theory of justice that challenges prominent discursive and 
dialogic ones. Finally, part IV delineates the politics that can be inferred from Cover’s 
perspective, and assesses—in contraposition to the very different appraisals of Robert 
Post and Austin Sarat—its relationship (or lack thereof) with political liberalism. I 
conclude with a short summary of the most salient points and with suggestions to direct 
legal theory away from its current state of lethargy towards a new beginning. 
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The true artists of speech remain always conscious of the 
metaphorical character of language. They go on correcting and 
supplementing one metaphor by another, allowing their words to 
contradict each other and attending only to the unity and certainty of 
their thought.  
 Karl Vossler1
INTRODUCTION 
I am not the only one to think that Nomos and Narrative is one of the most 
original, thought-provoking, and illuminating law articles ever written. Already in one 
single first paragraph, Robert Cover created a whole normative world for us to imagine:  
We inhabit a nomos—a normative universe. We constantly create and maintain a 
world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void. [T]he 
formal institutions of the law … are, indeed, important to that world; they are, 
however, but a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our 
attention. No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the 
narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an 
epic, for each Decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the 
narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be 
observed, but a world in which we live.2
Arguably Cover presents an innovative concept of law. But as important as this 
might be, Nomos and Narrative is much more than that. To me it is first and foremost an 
invitation to look at the richness and multiplicity of diverse manifestations of law, as 
well as to resuscitate our sense of sheer wonder for the complex, ubiquitous, and 
fascinating phenomenon of law. Indeed, Cover urges us to rescue the ideals, motives, 
 
1 K. VOSSLER, POSITIVISMUS UND IDEALISMUS IN DER SPRACHWISSENSCHAFT, 
Heidelberg (1904), cited by M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARD A POST-
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, paperback 1974, at 102 (1st ed. 
1958). 
2 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.  L. 
REV. 4, at 4-5 (1983), footnotes omitted. [Hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative: all page references 
are to this article, unless otherwise noted.] 
5and themes that made us love law to begin with and, in some cases, even to adopt it as a 
form of life. In contrast to this sentiment of mine, Robert Post recounts that when he 
assigned this text to his students, it did not move them at all; rather, they found it distant 
and indecipherable, informed by a sensibility of another generation.3 In a sense, I 
conceive this essay as an attempt to unravel what I found so enlightening about Nomos 
and Narrative. At the same time, I am trying to persuade the generation of Post’s 
students—which is mine—that Cover’s insights are as timely as ever.4
Cover can be and has been approached from many perspectives: He has been 
placed in the context of constitutional law,5 political philosophy,6 and theology;7 and his 
insights have been used to reclaim the importance of non-statist actors,8 to frame the 
relations of state and supra-statist structures,9 or applied in more doctrinal contexts of 
 
3 R. Post, Who’s afraid of Jurispathic Courts? Violence and Public Reason in ‘Nomos and Narrative’, 17 
YALE  J. L. & H. 9, 9 (2005) [hereinafter Post, Who is afraid]. (We shall speak about Post in section IV).  
4 In spite of being published more than twenty years ago, Nomos and Narrative still creates considerable 
ink. In 2005 there was a Symposium with the title Rethinking Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative,
published in the Yale Journal of Law and Humanities [17 YALE J. L. & H. (2005)] and collaborations of 
Robert Burt, Robert Post, Judith Resnik, Aviam Soifer, Steven Fraade, Suzanne Last Stone, and Beth 
Berkowitz; and in January 2006 another Symposium was inaugurated in The Berkeley Electronic Press, 
Issues in Legal Scholarship, and articles of Ian Ward, Anthony Bradney, Richard Mullender, John Alder, 
and Thom Brooks, articles which can all be accessed at htpp://www.bepress.com/ils/iss8/ [last accessed 
November, 2006]. 
5 P. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, in 99 YALE L. J., 1, 55-63 (1989) 
[hereinafter Kahn, Community]; also Post, Who is afraid, supra note 3. 
6 A. Sarat & T. R. Kearns, Making Peace With Violence: Robert Cover on Law and Legal Theory, in 
LAW’S VIOLENCE, ed. by Sarat and Kearns, The U. of M. Press, Ann Arbor, 1992, 211; R. Sherwin, 
Law, Violence, and Illiberal Belief, in 78 GEO. L. J. 1786 (1989/90); J. Alder, Robert Cover’s ‘Nomos 
and Narrative’: The Court as Philosopher King or Pontius Pilate?, Issues in Legal Scholarship # 4,  
THE BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS 2006 (htpp://www.bepress.com/ils/iss8/).
7 See S. Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary 
American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1993); see also S. J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: 
Translating Robert Cover’s ‘Nomos and Narrative’, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465. 
8 J. Boyarin, Circumscribing Constitutional Identities in Kiryas Joel, 106 YALE L. J. 1537 (1997); J. 
Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J. 
L. & H. 17 (2005). 
9 R. Mullender, Two Nomoi and a Clash of Narratives: The Story of the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, Article # 3 Issues in Legal Scholarship, THE BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS 
2006 (htpp://www.bepress.com/ils/iss8/).   
6choice of law.10 My own perspective is that of a legal theorist. I think that in this respect 
his views have not been given enough credit.11 Ultimately, I aim to show that Cover 
offers an interesting alternative paradigm of law,12—alternative that is, to the two most 
influential legal philosophers of the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen and Herbert Hart.13 
My analysis is divided into four sections (and conclusions). First, I will speak of 
the nomos as an individual entity and disentangle the enigmatic, yet crucial concept of 
what it means to inhabit it (I. 1.). I will ask questions such as: What are the constitutive 
elements of the nomos? How it is structured? What forces impinge on it? Are there 
limits to the nomos? Is it is possible to separate it from other normative systems? Next, I 
will explain how normativity is constructed in connection to both commitment and 
objectification (I. 2.). This section ends with the analysis of the typology distinctively 
employed by Cover, namely the paideic and the imperial (I. 3.). The second section will 
take a broader perspective and observe the plural normative space in which diverse 
 
10 P. DANE, Conflict of Laws, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW & LEGAL 
THEORY 209 (Dennis Patterson, ed., 1996). 
11 I found one exception, F. G. Snyder’s Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication: Toward a Jurisgenetic 
Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1623 (1999). However, Snyder’s article seems more to 
develop a personal theory of law than to reconstruct Cover’s own. 
12 In order to qualify as a paradigm, a theory of law needs at least to incorporate an ontology (an 
understanding of the basic units and organizational structure), an epistemology (an account of legal 
knowledge, reasoning and interpretation), and an axiology (how legal value is created, assessed, and 
maintained).  
13 The influence of Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen in Continental Europe (and by extension in countries 
subject to colonial rule, as well as in Latin America) cannot be overstated, to the point that one cannot 
understand 20th century jurisprudence without him. Kelsen taught in North America for over thirty years, 
but inexplicably, his work is rarely considered in this context. However, his contribution to legal thought 
is so pervasive that it is sometimes taken for granted—such as the pyramidal structure of law, its 
constitution as a system, or his insistence that the law is prescriptive, but the science of law is descriptive,
and that as science, legal theory is only possible if these two levels (the is and the ought) are rigidly 
separated. The influence of H.L.A. Hart, especially but not only within the Anglo-American world, is 
unquestionable, and many of his theoretical insights—the difference between primary and secondary 
rules, the concept of the rule of recognition, its foundation in social practice, or the distinction between 
internal and external perspectives—are current coinage in everyday legal discourse. To be sure, more 
names (and whole movements) can be added, but no individual thinker has the stature of these two giants. 
In the American context we could perhaps add a third name to the list, Ronald Dworkin, both for the 
breadth of his jurisprudence and for its viability as an alternative to legal positivism. 
7nomic entities (or nomoi) coexist and are forced to interact. In particular, I will analyze 
Cover’s distinction between insular and redemptive (II. 1 and 2) types. In the third 
section, I will consider the distinct possibility of clashes among disparate nomic entities, 
which will bring to the fore the context of adjudication, and the role Cover reserves to 
courts in this regard (III. 1 and 2). This section concludes with the singular theory of 
justice that can be attributed to Cover (III. 3.). Finally, I will delineate the politics that 
can be inferred from Cover’s view of the juridical arena and assess its relationship (or 
lack thereof) with political liberalism (IV). I will conclude with a short summary of the 
most salient points. 
 
I. NOMOS: A NORMATIVE UNIVERSE 
Cover is known for having argued that in every (plural) society there exist, 
alongside with the state, multiple normative entities that create and maintain their own 
sense of normativity, that is, their own holistic modes of assessing good and bad, valid 
and invalid, right and wrong.    
Beyond that, few systematic attempts have been made to pay Cover’s legal 
theory its due, which is, I believe, inconsistent with the attention he has otherwise 
received. Several reasons may explain this. First, Cover’s poetic style of writing defies 
all academic conventions; his writing is evocative more than argumentative, 
metaphorical more than analytical, prophetic more than systematic. Cover writes to 
enlighten the reader and make him see, not to prove or demonstrate; he writes to inspire 
and awaken, not to reason and persuade. He rarely stops to explain or justify; either you 
follow, or you are lost. Secondly, Cover is an intellectually demanding thinker: the 
8authors he cites are not part of the common lore of legal education and push the reader 
in more than one direction at once; his citations are often obscure, almost cryptic, and 
the reader is often left on her own to fill in the gaps. Finally, there is the fact that Cover 
is taking up the challenge of going against deeply ingrained habits of mind, and the bulk 
and landmarks of twentieth century legal scholarship. All these things entail an extra 
effort of attention and perseverance that not everyone is willing to make.14 My purpose 
here is to show that the effort is amply worth our while.  
Before I begin, I must warn the reader that, in order to reconstruct Cover’s 
jurisprudence, I must expand on certain allusions, follow up some of his threads, mark 
invisible signposts, stop at significant crossroads, and frame some of his thoughts in a 
different envelope. In short, I must write against the grain of Cover’s writing, attending 
not to his metaphorical language, but to the unity and certainty of his thought—as 
remarked by Karl Vossler in the opening citation. Also, I shall be answering to criticism 
that has been or may be raised against Cover—obviously, not as he effectively answered 
it (how could he?), but how he might conceivably have done so. This requires 
imaginatively recreating the mental universe of another person out of a blueprint, which 
will hopefully still be attributable to its main architect. Notwithstanding, I do not deny 
that my own personal perspective and interests do—necessarily and inevitably—
pervade such interpretation. I say this not to disclaim responsibility, but rather for the 
opposite. I admit that, incidentally, I entertain the idea of presenting a theory of law that 
can stand independently from Cover’s own concerns. To assist the reader, I have tried to 
keep separated both what Cover said, and what can be safely attributed to him, from my 
 
14 To be sure, there may be other kinds of reason that reflect not a lack of appreciation, but of 
disagreement, political or other, with his jurisprudence. 
9interpretation of it—including the illumination of obscurities and elucidation of 
controversial points—and even from expansions on his thoughts which ought to be 
marked with a more personal pronoun. Bearing all this in mind, I hope the reader will 
judge that I have not done violence to his word.15 
I. 1. The Thickness of Cover’s Nomos: Precept, Mythos, and Language
One of Cover’s most original insights is that law should be understood not as a 
system of rules but as a nomos, or normative universe. This conceptualization pushes us 
to ask questions such as: How is the nomos constituted? What does it mean to inhabit it? 
How is it learned? How can one master it? Can it be changed and transformed? Are 
there limits to it? Is it possible to distinguish it from other similar manifestations? In this 
section we will try to answer each one of these questions.  
We must begin with the very term nomos. Cover’s use of the Greek word nomos 
is subject to misinterpretation. Generally speaking, nomos can be translated variously as 
law, norm, habit, regularity, or convention, but as the great classical historian Werner 
Jaeger explains, such is a derivative usage.16 In its original sense it referred not to a 
 
15 The pun is intended and must be explained: In the course of his academic life, Cover naturally wrote 
other scholarly pieces [these can be found in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER, Minow, Ryan, and Sarat eds., The Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 
(1992)]. As a method, however, I have taken Nomos and Narrative as a self-sufficient piece of writing. 
Thus, I have not felt obliged to square the views presented here with those presented elsewhere, notably 
in his very much publicized Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601 (1986). This is not just a 
question of convenience but of consideration: Violence and the Word is written to address other kind of 
concerns and, I feel, with a sensibility altogether different from the one informing Nomos and Narrative.
Personally, I find the Cover of Nomos and Narrative more constructive—open and eye-opening—than 
the Cover of Violence and the Word. It is the former and not the latter I want to pursue.           
16 For the historical evolution of this word (and of Greek cultural, i.e., normative values in general), as 
well as for its fundamental seat in juridical, philosophical, and medical thinking, see the excellent work of 
W. JAEGER, PAIDEIA, 3 vols. (esp. v. 1), translated into English by Gilbert Highet, New York, Oxford 
Univ. Press. 1939 and 1943-4. Robert Cover makes explicit reference to this work (at 6 n. 9). For a 
shorter and very useful historical evolution of the term nomos, see, same author, Praise of Law: The 
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particular law or single piece of legislation (positive law), but to the sum total of that 
which was respected by all as living tradition with regard to what is right or wrong.17 
Cover returns to this original meaning and uses the term to signify not an individual law, 
but the whole normative corpus of a living community. On the other hand, it is also 
important to dispel a second possible misconception due to the famous Sophist 
dichotomy between nomos (convention) and physis (nature). In this dichotomy the laws 
of convention are said to be followed merely by force of habit or fear (hence 
unnaturally), whereas the laws of physis such as the “law of the stronger” and “might is 
right” are said to follow untrammeled human nature.18 By the time of the Sophists, 
however, the word nomos had suffered a great semantic transformation. The work of 
prior thinkers like Hesiod, Solon, and pre-Socratic philosophers like Heraclitus shows 
no essential dichotomy between physis and nomos because the laws that govern the 
cosmic and the moral worlds are basically thought to be in agreement.19 Cover returns to 
the original meaning of the term. In his view, the nomos is not imposed upon the 
individual as it were externally, but comes naturally through a process of acculturation 
and learned gradually from childhood (at 5).20 Once internalized, the nomos forms part 
 
Origin of Legal Philosophy and the Greeks, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHIES, New York, Oxford. Univ. Press, 1947 [hereinafter, Jaeger, Praise of Law]. 
17 Jaeger, Praise of Law (supra note 16), at 361.  
18 For the harshest expression of the law of the stronger, way before Nietzsche’s will to power, see Plato’s 
characters Thrasymachus (in the Republic) and Callicles (in the Gorgias). For the law of the stronger 
applied to real world politics, see Thucydides, The Peloponesian War.
19 In archaic and classical Greek thinking, nomos is deeply related both to Dike (justice) and to logos 
(order, reason). It is only in the late fifth and the fourth centuries B.C. that the negative connotations of 
the word nomos as something imposed artificially, and hence felt as a constraint, began to surface. For the 
deep interconnection between the ideas of the universe and moral ideas of justice see, among others, the 
pre-Socratic philosopher Anaximander who described the universal process of coming to be and passing 
away like a juridical process of atonement [W. JAEGER, THE THEOLOGY OF THE EARLY GREEK 
PHILOSOPHERS 34-6 (The Gifford Lectures 1936, Wipf & Stock Publishers, Oregon, 2003)].  
20 Cover cites the work of pedagogues, developmental psychologists, and moral psychologists such as 
Piaget, Kohlberg, Erikson, or Gilligan. For a jurisprudential treatment of the views of Piaget and 
Kohlberg, see B. JACKSON, MAKING SENSE IN JURISPRUDENCE 19-25, Deborah Charles 
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of the psycho-social structure of the individual as much as do the physical phenomena 
of mass, energy, and momentum.  
Generally, the nomos can be said to inhere in the social life of the community. In 
other words, every social group with enough sense of its own differentiation with 
respect to its worldview and life-project is liable to generate its own normative activity 
and constitute itself as a nomos. An interesting question is whether every social group 
qualifies as a normative community. For instance, can a band of pirates be said to 
constitute a nomos? Cover is not explicit about this, but his examples (Amish, 
Mennonites, Garrisonians, Radical Constitutionalists, Bob Jones University, Pro-Life 
and Women’s movements) entail invariably: a) a well-constituted and fully blossomed 
human collective; b) a self-consciousness of collective identity (to think of themselves 
as a group); c) a perception of sharing and being bound by common authoritative texts; 
and d) certain normative projects-of-life. This characterization would possibly exclude 
collectives united on a purely contingent basis, or on instrumental reasons alone, with 
no normative aspiration. What is clear is that the criteria for denying a particular social 
collective the category of a nomos cannot be based on particular moral likes and 
dislikes. Also, it is important to remark that nomos and community are two separate 
things. As Cover says, the nomos is the creation of a community that already has an 
identity (at 50 n. 137). Nevertheless, once created, these norms to which the group now 
feels bound help to shape their life-in-common. As a result, the nomos also creates the 
community. Conceivably the relationship between nomos and community is a 
metonymic one, where the former stands for the normative identity of the latter. At any 
 
Publications, Liverpool (1996). About how law is learned see, more recently, C. Engel, Learning the 
Law, PREPRINTS OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE ON COLLECTIVE GOODS, Bonn, 2004-05. 
The paper can be accessed at http://ssrn.com/abstract=539982.
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rate, variances in the nomos help to distinguish one given social group from another, as 
well as members of one group from members of another. 
Not only does the nomos inhere in the life of the community, but is itself 
inherently communal. Indeed, law makes no sense except as a social or collective 
phenomenon. In an argument that echoes Wittgenstein’s against private languages,21 
Cover affirms that a purely idiosyncratic nomos would be utterly unintelligible, 
presumably because the very idea of a normative behavior—as behavior that must be
followed—is pointless in a world inhabited by only one person. At the very least, “any 
person who lived an entirely idiosyncratic normative life would be quite mad” (at 10).22 
Further, no legal precept can be properly understood without the social mapping 
provided by the narratives in which it is located, and these, Cover says, are inherently 
communal.23 As a result, the community and not the individual is, for Cover, the basic 
unity of normative life. Not only that, taking to heart the Aristotelian definition of man 
as a political animal (zoon politikon), it seems that no one can live without or outside the 
nomos. All this entails that the individual accesses the normative life through the social 
group to which she belongs, not meant to deny that she may switch memberships and 
learn other normative vocabularies in the course of her life. Still, these new languages 
will be added on top of the old ones and acquired through the social and cultural 
medium.  
 
21 L. Wittgenstein, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS sections 241-271 (3rd ed. 1999). 
22 For those unconvinced by Wittgenstein, I recommend Jorge Luis Borges’ short-story Funes el 
Memorioso, an unsurpassed narrative about the absurdity of conceiving a language that only one person 
could speak.  
23 As he puts it: “[t]he intelligibility of normative behavior inheres in the communal character of the 
narratives that provide the context of that behavior” (at 10). He continues: “the part that your or I choose 
to play may be singular, but the fact that we can locate it in a common ‘script’ renders it ‘sane’” (id.). 
Cover acknowledges that groups can also generate madness: however, he still sees a difference between 
collective and idiosyncratic acts (at 10 n. 28). 
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What, then, are the elements that constitute the nomos? Traditional legal theory 
has it that law is ontologically structured in discrete units, namely rules and principles, 
and made functional by the use of certain logical and deontic operators. Cover deems 
this model unnecessarily restrictive of the richness of the nomos, as well as oblivious to 
the real forces that make the normative universe spin. In light of the Kuhnian concept of 
paradigm, Cover’s nomos incorporates not only a body of precepts, but also a language 
and a mythos (at 9).24 I trust that the meaning of the “body of precepts” is quite 
straightforward and needs no special attention. What needs explaining now is Cover’s 
understanding of both “language” and “mythos,” for they are thicker than their common 
use in legal and analytical discourse. First, legal language is not just the specialized 
system of grammatical or syntactical rules for the correct utterance of legal propositions. 
Rather, the language of law is, like the nomos itself, a world that the speaker inhabits.25 
As a normative language, it provides the lexicon by which things, persons, or actions are 
judged as being right/wrong, good/bad, noble/ignoble, licit/illicit. 26  However, being a 
competent inhabitant of this language requires more than knowing how a particular 
word, concept, or precept is used; significantly, one must know how it is charged, that 
is, the heavy load of symbols, images, and values it carries which defies rationalization. 
Cover suggests that in the legal sphere there are terms so heavily charged that no use 
(not even a competent one) can lift. One can think, for example, of the term 
 
24 Cover says his understanding of the nomos holds a “rough correspondence” to Kuhn’s scientific 
paradigm that integrates method, belief, and propositions (at 6 n. 10). 
25 In Heideggerian fashion, to say that the speaker inhabits a language is to say that language construes its 
speaker as much as the speaker construes her language. As we shall see, legal language is both repository 
and constitutive of communal identity. Cover’s understanding of the relationship between language and 
community is indebted to the work of James Boyd White, as he acknowledges (at 6-7 n. 11 in fine). 
26 As Cover says, “… law is a resource in signification that enables us to submit, rejoice, struggle, 
pervert, mock, humiliate, or dignify” (at 8). In fact, the greatness of a legal tradition is perceived in the 
possibilities of expression, argument, and judgment that its language avails (at 6).  
14
“unpatriotic” in the American context, where such a charge puts that person in an 
untenable position—just like being called a “communist” fifty odd years ago; or think of 
the storm that terms such as “occupied territories” and “self-determination” can cause in 
other contexts. Cover’s insight applies also to entire legal institutions: without such 
charge, it is virtually impossible to explain the virulence of contemporary debates about 
the legal definition of marriage or adoption, generated precisely between alternative 
conceptions of normative life or, we may now call them, nomoi.
In regard to myths, these are not fictional or irrational stories doomed to 
disappear with the coming of age of civilization. Rather, the myth is the symbolic form 
by which every human group conceives its relations to its own distant past, locates itself 
in the course of history, and presents itself to the outer world.27 For that reason, it does 
not matter whether or not the myth is “pure invention,” because its workings are real 
both in the social imagination of that group and in its interactions with the exterior 
world. To illustrate this point, Cover offers the example of the law of inheritance in the 
bible: In the level of legal precept, the rules that regulate the institution of inheritance 
seem clear and unproblematic. They state, for instance, that the oldest son will succeed 
his father as head of the family.28 However, such a simple rule is made problematic by 
the narratives in which it is embedded, and which flatly contradict it. Particularly 
interesting is that whenever the rule of inheritance is undermined, the mythos associates 
it with the workings of the divine hand. Therefore, to understand the law of inheritance 
in the bible, or as Cover puts it, to be an inhabitant of the biblical normative world, is to 
 
27 As such, “[myths establish] a repertoire of moves—a lexicon of normative action” (at 9). 
28 Cover at 20, citing Deuteronomy 21:15-17. 
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know not only that this rule can be overturned, but that God’s will is likely to be behind 
the overturning of this specific rule (at 22).  
If precept, myth, and language—including the range of images and symbols that 
we have called charge—are constitutive elements of every nomos, such a world is held 
together by the force of the interpretive commitments of those who inhabit it (at 7). In 
other words commitment, and not logical or deontic operators, is the primary force 
behind the nomos. Although we shall speak further about it, we can already advance that 
commitment is an act of personal engagement with the legal precept that determines 
what law means and law shall be (id.). Noticeably, this definition puts commitment in 
intimate relationship with legal interpretation. For Cover, this process is not amenable to 
a set of operational or linguistic activities, such as that of determining whether an 
electrically propelled vehicle falls within the scope of the “no vehicles in the park” 
rule.29 Nor does interpretation come as something of a supplement to the rule after the 
identification of valid law, but simultaneously with it and as precondition of legal 
meaning.30 In addition, Cover stresses that legal interpretation occurs always within the 
constraints (institutional or other) of the interpretive setting.31 
In sum, Cover’s jurisprudence suggests that a comprehensive theory of law must 
integrate all these elements in order to have an adequate glimpse of its object of study.  
 
29 Cover at 6. This is an example used by Hart in THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); hereinafter 
references are to the 2nd. ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford (1994), with an added Postcript edited by A. 
Bulloch and J. Raz. 
30 The view that the law is inherently interpretive is associated with Ronald Dworkin. However, Cover 
criticizes Dworkin for not taking into account the constraints of the interpreter (at 35 n. 98).  
31 From this perspective, one is reminded of Gadamer’s bounded interpreter, although Cover takes issue 
with Gadamer for not having adequately struggled with what is specifically legal of legal hermeneutics 
(at 6 n. 11). In defense of Gadamer one may say that he is not interested in expanding the concept of legal 
hermeneutics, but in bringing back into a general theory of hermeneutics one of the former’s fundamental 
insights, the importance of application. Application is, for Gadamer, the way of incorporating the 
interpreter’s present situation into the text (yet recognizing at the same time that there is an applicable 
text to begin with), and he shares many of Cover’s own concerns. 
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Some may want to believe that the positivistic framework has overcome at least the 
mythical foundations that enliven the biblical world. However, Cover is right to point 
out that every legal system must conceive itself in one way or another as emerging out 
of that which is itself unlawful (at 23). And this, Cover states, always entails a narrative 
about how the law came to be (at 45). Thus, regardless of the act of origin (revolution, 
migration, catastrophe, or theogony), and the narrative device used to explain it (the 
Pilgrim fathers, Robinson Crusoe, Mount Sinai, or the positivistic rule of recognition 
and Grundnorm), the foundation of law is still mythical (at 23).32 
As many before him, Cover believes that there can be no pure or unmediated 
access to normativity.33 But then, how is it possible to reach the normative realm and, 
more importantly, to express it? Cover suggests that narrative may be the key that opens 
that door. Narrative is an important term-of-art that merits some pause. The proper way 
to frame the issue is not through the customary dichotomy between fact and fiction, but 
rather through the one between fact and value.34 Indeed, Cover places narrative in the 
context of the latter dichotomy but only to overcome it. For Cover, fact and value—
narrative account and normative assessment—are inseparably related. As he says, every 
prescription (norm, covenant, value) is placed within a narrative that explains it and 
gives it meaning. At the same time, every narrative (be it historical or imaginary) is 
insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral (at 5). Cover, whose views on 
 
32 Cf. J. Derrida, Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 
(1990). For Cover such “foundation” does not imply a fixed canon of narratives (at 4 n. 3 and n. 4). In 
fact, given that myths of origin can neither be entirely domesticated nor prevented, they always provide 
the “typology for a dangerous return” (see at 23-24 with n. 66).   
33 Cover does not believe in the world of “pure” prescription, for even if there was one, it would be as 
inaccessible as the law in Kafka’s known parable before the law. 
34 Sometimes Cover associates narrative with imagination and thus seemingly with fiction. However, he 
does so to stress that no matter whether narrative is the result of what did happen (history) or might have 
happened (literature)—that is, either as historical or fictionalized account of a fact—it is always and 
invariably in search of value.
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narrative are influenced by Hayden White, argues further that narrative is in fact the act 
of imposing a normative force upon reality.35 In other words, narrative gives reality a 
shape, and a sense of direction, plot, and trajectory that it would otherwise lack.36 This 
implies that the normative significance of a given state of affairs, real or imaginary, is 
inevitably tainted by the world of value implied in its narrative construction. Yet this 
need not be cause for alarm but for celebration: if the act of narrating adds value to the 
world of fact, narrative traverses—and allows us to traverse—the seemingly 
unbridgeable distance between fact and value.37 In other words, by connecting a given 
reality with its normative significance, narrative serves to connect the world of the is 
with the world of the ought.
Regrettably, such a critical contribution to legal philosophy has gone largely 
unnoticed. Still, today the world of law is largely thought to be that of the “ought,” 
completely different from that of the “is.” Legal positivism has it with Hume that there 
exists an unbridgeable gap between the “is” and the “ought.” All this creates an 
insuperable dilemma for legal theory that cannot explain—except as the result of acts of 
pure will—how it is possible for social practices to become norms.38 Cover’s response is 
 
35 This is what Hayden White refers to as the “moralizing effect” of narrative. As he writes narrative “is 
intimately related to, if not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality” and, in fact, “presupposes the 
existence of a legal [a social-political] system” [H. White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation 
of Reality, in ON NARRATIVE, ed. by W. Mitchell, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London, (1980-1), 1-23; citations are to pages 14 and 13 respectively]. 
36 As Cover says, the various literary genres—history, fiction, tragedy, comedy—can all be seen as the 
“imposition of a normative force upon a state of affairs” (at 10). This recalls Mikhail Bakhtin’s definition 
of genres not as sets of conventions or instrumental devices, but as fundamental ways of shaping the 
world or “form-shaping ideologies”; M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR 
ESSAYS, M. Holquist ed. (1981). The relationship between Cover and Bakhtin has been interestingly 
explored by R. Mullender (supra note 9).  
37 This does not preclude being suspicious about the normative value created by each particular narrative. 
For a good example of such critical attitude, see Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L. J. 
1835 (2005).     
38 H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1934; 2nd rev. ed. 1968). The Hartian account followed by 
many according to which norms are ultimately grounded on social practice (e.g. recently A. Marmor, 
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ingenious in its simplicity. First of all, to the twofold ontological distinction between 
“is” and “ought” he incorporates a third category of being, the “might be.” This is no 
simple artifice. In fact, it can be said to have its roots in Aristotle,39 for whom things are 
not just how they actually are, but how they will be if they reach their potential, or, one 
could say, how they might be. The reinstatement of this third category of existence of 
norms serves Cover to verify the link between is and ought. This might be serves 
precisely to link a given social reality to the ideal world of normativity and makes an 
imagined alternative (as well as movement, change, and transformation) possible. This 
is why Cover defines law precisely as a bridge linking a given concept of reality to its 
imagined alternative [at 9]. And law is neither fully here in the realm of social reality 
nor there in the realm of pure normativity. Rather, law partakes of all three of these 
categories at once, for of every norm one can reasonably say that the norm is, that it 
ought to be, and that it might be. Therefore, “to live in the legal world requires that one 
know not only the precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states of 
affairs. It requires that one integrate not only the ‘is’ and the ‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the 
‘ought,’ and the ‘what might be’” (at 10).  
Does it mean then that every vision, no matter how ludicrous, can become a 
norm and form part of the nomos? This is another way of asking about the limits of the 
nomos. Cover does not address this issue directly, but I think one can make the 
necessary connections. The first limit derives from the collective nature of law. The 
presence of more than one individual ensures that the participants will have to find a 
 
How Law is Like Chess, USC LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 6-7) not only fails as such 
[see M. Greenberg, How facts make law, in 10 LEGAL THEORY 158 (2004)], but it is surprisingly 
unresponsive to this very dilemma.  
39 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS. 
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common intelligible language in which to articulate their visions. This process 
necessarily filters at least the most incongruent fantasies. However, in light of some 
collective quixotic acts the former limit appears insufficient. Cover sets up a second 
limit in the material reality in which law is supposed to be anchored. For Cover, law 
adds depth to utopia or pure vision and “rescues us from the eschatology that is the 
collision in this material world of the constructions of our minds” (at 10). In his view, 
groups who are consistently unable to convert vision into reality can be called 
movements, but no longer movements of the law (at 39). This would exclude chimeras 
unable to accommodate or adjust to their social and material surroundings.40 Among 
these surroundings we find, as a third limiting factor, the wills, visions, and agendas of 
other actors, with the potential ability to thwart and oppose an alleged “unencumbered 
nomos.” As a slightly different point, the nomos must take into account the predictable 
behavior of these other actors. This leads on occasion to the internal modification of the 
normative tenets of the group. This is what Cover refers to as second hermeneutic and 
brings about an additional (fourth) limit to the nomos. Lastly, a fifth limit derives from 
the general perception of law as something with the power to bind us. This perception 
implies that at a given point the subjectivity of the interpreter must give way to postulate 
an object to which one owes obedience as law. This is the process that Cover calls 
objectification and represents yet another curbing signpost. In conclusion, it appears that 
the nomos is part and parcel of a complex—and wider—normative world (at 9) that it 
attempts to but cannot fully control. 
 
40 To these we must add the communities founded for purely contingent or instrumental reasons, and 
which do not espouse some sort of normative project (see supra).   
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Once we understand the nomos as a holistic form to organize the normative life 
and not as a system of rules, many a question which has seized the imagination of legal 
scholars becomes moot. Getting rid of old and exhausted questions and substituting 
them for new and more illuminating ones is, some say, the only way to define 
intellectual progress.41 Yet providing an answer for the old questions from the new 
framework would speak in favor of one tradition over another.42 Cover does not deal 
with these questions himself and it is only my own jurisprudential analysis which 
compels me to do so here. Yet I will try to answer them as I imagine Cover would have 
tried to do.  
One of those perennial issues is about the structure of the legal system. The 
nomos is not to be imagined as a pyramid in which each norm is validated by its 
immediate superior until we reach the higher normative step of the ladder.43 Rather, it is 
to be thought of as being organized internally through a language, elaborated through 
narrative, and stored like the rest of social memory. Such conceptualization would help 
to ease some of the well known problems associated with the pyramidal model. I shall 
mention four of the most pressing ones. First, the existence of very real normative 
sources—i.e. soft law, informal regulation, non-official practices—that are not 
acknowledged by, and therefore escape, the gaze of the pyramid. Second, the apparition 
of what philosophers of law François Ost and Michel van de Kerchove denominate as 
boucle étranges (strange loops) in which an inferior rule takes precedence over the 
 
41 R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (1989). 
42 A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? University of Notre Dame Press, 
Notre Dame: Indiana (1988).  
43 Despite well-known objections, the Kelsenian metaphor is still a favorite in most legal minds. The 
Hartian rule of recognition, seemingly devised to take over the pyramid, does in fact reproduce the same 
structure.   
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superior, which subverts the hierarchy and therefore the very foundations of the 
pyramid.44 Third, the inability of the pyramid to contemplate several and conflicting 
supreme norms at the same time and place.45 Finally, the rigidity of the pyramidal model 
and its inadequacy to explain legal change except as a result of deliberate and willful 
action.   
Cover’s view of the nomos suggests, in contrast, a system flexible enough to 
incorporate sources and materials traditionally kept out of the legal frame. In fact, the 
nomos is radically open and contains no fixed rule for the identification of valid law. In 
other words, no pedigree or ladder is there to decide beforehand whether a given norm 
belongs to the nomos or not. Yet this does not mean that the nomos has no mechanism 
for doing so, but only that such determination can only be achieved as a result of a 
constructive effort. Significantly, the determination of what counts as law within a given 
particular nomos at any given point in time depends, I would venture, on the evolving 
communal grasp of what is or is not legally relevant, for that nomos, at that time. On the 
other hand, given that the nomos is not hierarchically structured, the puzzles derived 
from the subversion of the pyramid do not arise. To be sure, some precepts are more 
important than others; but the status and meaning of these norms is permanently 
challenged.46 Indeed, considering that “prescriptive texts change their meaning with 
each new epic we choose to make relevant to them,” in a true sense, then, “every 
version of the framing of the Constitution creates a ‘new’ text” (at 4 n. 4). In fact, only 
 
44 In their excellent DE LA PYRAMIDE AU RÉSEAU? POUR UNE THÉORIE DIALECTIQUE DU 
DROIT, Publications des Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis (FUSL) # 94, Brussels (2002).   
45 See, recently, N. W. Barber, Legal Pluralism and the European Union, 12 EUROPEAN LAW 
JOURNAL 306-29 (2006).  
46 This is so because, as James Boyd White argues, “[t]he rule is often the subject as well as the source of 
argument.” J. B. White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 
CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985), at 689.     
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when the text proves unable to assimilate the meanings of new narratives, affirms 
Cover, does the need to create a new text through formal amendment arise (id.). As a 
result, the nomos is in continuous adaptative mode and allows for the interesting—and 
very real—possibility that at any given point there might be several contradictory 
fundamental norms at play.  
One final old question is the felt need to separate law from other normative 
systems, namely morality. Judging from how this debate has been conducted between 
juspositivists and jusnaturalists—the former saying that an unjust law is still legal, the 
latter that unjust law cannot be properly called law—I find the controversy tedious and 
not particularly illuminating. As this story is often told, the point seems to have been 
finally settled by Hart, who circumvented this dilemma by arguing that a legal rule may 
still be legal even though too iniquitous to be obeyed or applied.47 However, one cannot 
but wonder what kind of empty concept of law is one which requires neither obedience 
nor application. Cover enters this debate to state the obvious, and perhaps for that, in 
dire need of being said: “If there existed two legal orders with identical legal precepts 
and identical, predictable patterns of public force, they would nonetheless differ 
essentially in meaning if, in one of the orders, the precepts were universally venerated 
while in the other they were regarded by many as fundamentally unjust” (at 7, emphasis 
added). This suggests several things: First, that rules cannot determine their own justice 
 
47 HART, supra note 29, at 210. See also his LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY, Stanford Univ. Press, 
Stanford: California, 1963. The most famous debate about this issue was held between Hart and Lon 
Fuller, in the pages of the 71 Harvard Law Review (1958). Yet, there are other important actors. Among 
these, Gustav Radbruch declared that an intolerable law could not be called law. His views have been 
recently redefined by Robert Alexy [A defence of Radbruch’s Formula, in D. Dyzenhaus, ed. 
RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER, Hart Publishing: Oxford and 
Oregon (1999), 15-39]. For a recent appraisal of the position of both Radbruch and Alexy, see B. Bix, 
Robert Alexy’s Radbruch, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL STUDIES 
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 06-13, Draft Jan 2006.    
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or injustice; second, that depending on their various assessments the same rules can look 
unjust, just, or both. Third, that every legal system is imbued with and will be 
necessarily affected by at least the tacit moral judgment of the people that utter, receive 
and use the law.48 And fourth, that the true issue seems not one of determining whether 
an unjust law may be valid, but what it means to declare a law to be unjust, and how this 
declaration affects the application (and subsequent life) of such a law. 
This leads not, on the other hand, to conflate law and morality. Cover grants that 
“a law may be successfully enforced but actively resented” (at 7). In other words, a law 
may still be legal in spite of its being unjust. As I understand it, Cover is pointing out 
that in modern legal systems, it seems to be the case that, what the organs of the State 
declare to be the law may be enforced as law, regardless of what the addressees think 
about it.49 However, he also indicates that when a law is perceived as being unjust by 
the addressees and touches fundamental aspects of their lives, such a law will likely be 
greeted with rejection and, in some cases, with active resistance. If so, the way the law 
is judged (and this includes how it is judged morally) may affect the law’s subsequent 
life, and how it is understood, interpreted, complied with, and applied.  
 
48 About the idea of tacit knowledge, applied to the realm of science, see M. POLANYI, note 1.  
49 Certainly, it is not likely that those who enact the law will proclaim it as being unjust and profoundly 
immoral. This point is taken up by Alexy as a requirement of rationality or correctness [On Necessary 
Relations Between Law and Morality, 2 RATIO IURIS, 167-183 (1989); and again, replying to criticism, 
in On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin’s Critique, 12 RATIO 
IURIS 138-147 (2000)]. But cf. Bix, supra note 47. Bix presents the hypothetical example of a country 
that would dismiss concerns of justice from the legal system altogether and substitute them for other kind 
of arguments (e.g. efficiency). This case is not unthinkable, and in fact Thucydides reports that such was 
the case of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Still, I think that Bix’s example is more the description 
of an outsider looking in on the system than what the insiders would say about it (this is the case with 
Thucydides too). At any rate, Thucydides seems to suggest that the attitude of Athens was not only a 
complete subversion of what was hitherto the case in the entire civilized world, but also that it led directly 
to and precipitated the political disaster and ultimate downfall of such a system. About this inevitable 
outcome, see J. B. White, The Dissolution of Meaning: Thucydides’ History of His World, in WHEN 
WORD LOSE THEIR MEANING, Chicago Univ. Press, Chicago and London (1985), 59-92.  
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Some legal thinkers have found it advisable not to conflate law and morality in 
order to leave some room for the moral criticism of law. I find this argument 
convincing, but cynical when advanced by those who would exclude moral judgment 
altogether from the realm of law.50 Cover finds a difference between law and morality, 
but not in the alleged lack of coercive power of morality (as in Kelsen) or of secondary 
rules (as in Hart). (One needs only to remember the Spanish Inquisition to realize that 
morality can be as coercive, enforceable, and structurally complex as the most coercive, 
elaborate, and immoral of the legal systems, if not more so.) This difference lies in their 
distinct rapprochement to social reality. Whereas law seeks inherently to transform 
vision into reality, argues Cover, morality can dispense with reality and remain as pure 
vision. The real interest of this argument is not the force of the distinction per se, as 
much as the power to navigate through it: indeed Cover sees both law and morality as 
similarly embedded in vision and thus sharing the same threads of ideals, aspirations, 
and goals. This means that every judgment of legality carries within it the germs of a 
potential moral judgment, without entailing, on the other hand, their mutual identity.  
In the final analysis, the nomos can be defined as a pervasive filter through 
which things, persons, and acts are observed and assessed. In other words, in addition to 
being a world in which to live, the nomos is also the prism through which the rest of the 
world is judged. The nomos provides its inhabitants with a thick sustenance of images, 
symbols, and narratives to understand, frame, and respond to the surrounding world. In 
this last respect, I would suggest that the rapport of the nomos with the outer (not 
normative) world is this: when the nomos enters in contact with the external world, or to 
 
50 If law does not incorporate within itself the tools for its effective criticism I find it illusory that 
something other than law will. In this absence, the argument for not conflating law and morality (to leave 
room for the critical assessment of law) becomes toothless sophism.    
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put it differently, when the world is filtered through the normative lens of the nomos, the 
nomos acts like a force field with the capacity to charge the world juridically. In other 
words, when objects, events, actions, narratives, or persons existing out in the world 
enter within the scope of action of the nomos—i.e., for one reason or another they 
happen to be relevant—they are impregnated with the normative force of that nomos.
According to the same principle, I would imagine, when two nomoi that share the same 
space collide they exercise an influence upon one another, that is, each affects the 
course of the other normative world.  
We shall speak further about mutually effecting interactions in section II, but 
now we must understand how legal meaning is constructed and becomes normative (i.e., 
binding) within the nomos.
I.2. The Construction of Normativity: Commitment and Objectification
Legal theorists still debate what exactly makes a legal norm a norm,51 that is, 
what marks the transition from, or mediates between, a given legal provision found in a 
legal instrument and a full-fledged norm capable of modeling human conduct.52 I should 
warn at once that I am not talking about what it is that makes the norm effective (what 
makes individuals conform their behavior to its dictates), but rather, about what it is that 
 
51 About this debate, although sometimes dressed in different clothes, see Hart, supra note 29, at 255-9; R. 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1977, at 48-58; J. RAZ, 
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY, Clarendon and Oxford Univ. 
Press, Oxford and New York, 1979, especially chapter 2; see, more recently, M. Greenberg, supra note 
38, arguing that law practices alone cannot determine their own contribution to the content of law.  
52 In what follows I shall use the terms “provision” (or to use Cover’s words “precept”) to refer to the 
legal utterance deprived of or still lacking in normative force, and the term “norm” to the one that it has it 
already. For the classic distinction between provisions—in Romance languages “dispositions”—and 
norms, see R. GUASTINI, DALLE FONTI ALLE NORME [Torino, 1st ed., 1990; in J. R. Bengoetxea, 
Direct Applicability of Effect, in A TRUE EUROPEAN: ESSAYS FOR JUDGE DAVID EDWARD, 
Hart, Oxford (2003), 353-366]. 
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makes it binding (what makes individuals accept it as mandatory). Clearly, the fact that 
the legal utterance emanates from the legitimate authority does not explain how 
authority is originally bestowed, nor why individuals yield their conformity to the 
provisions created by it.53 Without having to answer for now the foundations of the 
whole nomos, we may still want to say something about how the individual precept 
acquires normative significance. Unlike most legal positivists, Cover does not believe 
that a legal provision is automatically endowed with normative grip for reason of its 
being inserted in an official legal instrument. Rather, he states that every precept must 
be interpreted before it can become binding.54 However, in addition to interpretation a 
more personal act of engagement with the precept is also required. Interpretation 
particularizes a given precept as making a demand on the individual, but in order for this 
demand to acquire its full normative grip, adds Cover, the addressee must commit 
herself to the content of such an interpretation. Thus, “the transformation of 
interpretation into legal meaning begins when someone accepts the demands of 
interpretation and, through the personal act of commitment, affirms the position taken” 
(at 45). Commitment is, then, the personal act by which an individual asserts the 
meaning of a given precept and makes it his or her own.55 In doing so, the individual 
accepts the practical consequences derived from the legal precept as applied to her. In 
the process, the general and unspecified legal utterance becomes normatively charged.
53 This is the known problem of grounding the law to which, I submit, the positivistic tradition has yet to 
provide a fully satisfactory answer.  
54 In this he does not deviate from the views of those who accept the general distinction between 
provisions and norms. 
55 Although commitment is linked to praxis and in Cover’s view helps us distinguish between legal and 
speculative interpretations (at 45 n. 125), we should not assume that commitment is inexorably linked to a 
particular course of action. Logically, commitment does not determine action nor is it causally antecedent 
to it. How commitment eventually translates into praxis depends on many other factors, to name just one, 
on the possibilities left by the actions of other actors. 
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Considering that such personal engagement transforms the content of the law 
accordingly, it is not exaggerating to say that “interpretive commitments determine what 
law means and what law shall be” (at 7). The statement that commitment determines 
legal meaning is not metaphorical. As we saw, Cover affirms that “if there existed two 
legal orders with identical legal precepts ... they would nonetheless differ essentially in 
meaning if, in one of the orders, the precepts were universally venerated while in the 
other they were regarded by many as fundamentally unjust” (at 7). Cover offers an 
instance of this intimation in the case of the anti-slavery group the Garrisonians. 
Applying the dominant hermeneutic techniques of the day, the Garrisonians interpreted 
that the American Constitution gave support to slavery. In a sense, then, their 
interpretation agreed with that of Chief Justice Taney, when he declared that the 
Constitution dictated the return of runaway slaves.56 However, the Garrisonians were 
not committed to the principle of obedience to the Constitution that Taney took for 
granted. For them, a Constitution that permitted slavery could never be binding and 
ought not to be obeyed. On this basis alone Cover argues compellingly that their 
respective normative worlds differed radically (at 35-7). This example illustrates that no 
legal norm may be properly understood without accounting for the subjective rapport 
that the individual establishes with it. It also suggests that the subjective element is not 
something of a supplement to the norm, but forms part of its structure of signification. 
Accordingly, “to know the law—and certainly to live the law—is to know not only the 
objectified dimension of validation, but also the commitments that warrant 
interpretations” (at 46). 
 
56 Dredd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857). 
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The assertion may strike those who believe that law and legal knowledge are or 
need to be objective and purely descriptive.57 But upon consideration, it simply brings to 
legal language what we always suspected was true of language in general, namely, that 
every description is colored by the type of relationship we establish and want others to 
establish with what we describe.58 And this applies always and without exception. In his 
excellent book Personal Knowledge Michael Polanyi argues quite convincingly that 
every assertion of knowledge, even those we think of as scientific, carries within it an 
ineradicable act of personal engagement.59 In a passage that echoes many of Cover’s 
own concerns, Polanyi writes that such a personal form of knowledge “commits us, 
passionately and far beyond our comprehension, to a vision of reality. Of this 
responsibility we cannot divest ourselves... [f]or we live in it as in the garment of our 
own skin.”60 “According to the logic of commitment”, concludes Polanyi, “truth is 
something that can be thought only by believing it.”61 
Nothing said above should be interpreted as affirming that law and legal 
knowledge are merely subjective. In fact the very idea of commitment implies by 
 
57 For all see H. KELSEN, supra note 38. Hart’s internal point of view seems to accommodate some of 
what it is being said here, but at the end the day he still points out that what truly matters is convention—
practice—and not conviction—belief; see Hart’s own admission of this point in the Postscript to the 1994 
ed. of THE CONCEPT OF LAW (supra note 29) as a response to a criticism raised by Dworkin. 
58 The attitude of the speaker towards his own speech can make the same speech look sarcastic, ironic, 
cynical, or critical, and present its conclusions as something to be welcomed or to be afraid of.  
59 M. POLANYI, supra note 1. Cover cites Polanyi’s book in connection to the Kuhnian concept of 
scientific paradigm that integrates not only propositions and methods, but also beliefs. Cover affirms that 
such an understanding of science holds a “rough correspondence” with his own view of the normative 
world ( n. 10 and accompanying text).  
60 POLANYI, supra note 1, at 64.  
61 POLANYI, supra note 1, at 305. This is not to say that knowledge is merely subjective. On the 
contrary, Polanyi stresses that “[t]he inherent structure of this fundamental act of personal knowing 
makes us both necessarily participate in its shaping and acknowledge its results with universal intent.” 
This means that “it is the act of commitment in its full structure that saves personal knowledge from 
being merely subjective” (at 65). Also in law, one can be said to participate in the creation of knowledge 
as well as to claim validity beyond it. For what it means to have legal knowledge, see James Boyd White, 
Legal Knowledge, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1396 (2001-2002). 
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definition that we are committed to something other than ourselves. In the juridical field, 
that to which we are committed is posited as the object of law: “The community posits a 
law, external to itself, that it is committed to obeying and that it does obey in dedication 
to its understanding of that law” (at 45). This objectified “other” generally becomes a 
text, which is an essential ingredient “to the language games that can be played with the 
law and to the meanings that can be created out of it” (id.). This process of positing an 
external object of law is what Cover calls objectification: “Frequently, perhaps always,” 
says Cover, it “entails a narrative—a story of how the law, now object, came to be, and 
more importantly, how it came to be one’s own” (id.). Narrative is, we have seen, the 
“literary genre for the objectification of value” (id.). With it the full structure for the 
construction of legal meaning is finally revealed: “The creation of legal meaning”, 
explains Cover, “entails the disengagement of the self from the ‘object’ of law, and at 
the same time requires an engagement to that object as a faithful ‘other’” (id.). In other 
words, legal meaning is created by the “subjective commitment to an objectified 
understanding of a demand” (id.). Thus, “in the normative universe, legal meaning is 
created by simultaneous engagement and disengagement, identification and 
objectification” (at 44, emphasis added). 
Apparently, commitment and objectification, subjective engagement and 
objective disengagement, spin the cycle in two opposite directions at once. Although 
Cover does not quite put it in this way, I find it useful to break down each motion into 
separate logical steps. First, on the direction that goes from the legal utterance to the 
norm, the legal utterance is interpreted as establishing a demand which lacks normative 
force until the individuals commit to it. These steps can be put in the following 
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sequence: 1) legal provision; 2) interpretation; 3) demand; 4) commitment; and 5) norm. 
It must be clear that these steps serve only as logical representation of a non-linear 
sequence: the norm reached at the end must be interrogated on each separate occasion, 
giving rise to a multiplicity of possible provisions that require further commitments. The 
stability achieved with the normative determination of the precept is therefore apparent 
(though not less real). Second, in the opposite direction from commitment to the object 
of law, one can say that commitment is objectified as an external precept to which 
individuals owe obedience as law, generating the following sequence: 1) commitment; 
2) objectification; 3) precept; 4) obedience; and 5) law. Again, the law that exacts 
obedience as law must be interrogated in each separate occasion and thus leaves room 
for a multiplicity of possible commitments.  
Two final observations: First, it will be noted that each sequence is the perfect 
mirror of the other. Provision, interpretation, and demand are mirrored by commitment, 
objectification, and precept, respectively; whereas the commitment that leads to the 
norm has its correlative in the obedience owed to the law. In turn, the extreme that 
initiates each sequence has its correlative in the extreme that culminates the other: The 
legal provision that propitiates the process of commitment has its correlative in the law 
that culminates the process of objectification; and vice versa, the norm that culminates 
the process of commitment has its correlative in the commitment with which 
objectification begins.62 The second observation relates to the fact that these motions 
occur simultaneously and make the whole process a bi-directional one. As a result, the 
formation of legal meaning must be thought of as a never-ending cycle spinning around 
the opposite motions of commitment and objectification.  
 
62 It goes without saying that “beginning,” “end,” “initiation,” and “culmination” are relative terms. 
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The question we must answer now is how these separate motions impinge on the 
constitutive elements of the nomos to affect its internal configuration. 
 
I. 3. The Nomos as a Living Organism: Paideic and Imperial
Following an insight of sixteenth century Jewish codifier, commentator, and 
mystic Joseph Caro,63 Cover identifies two distinct principles of organization of the 
nomos or, he says, two “ideal typical patterns for combining corpus, discourse, and 
interpersonal commitments” (at 12). On the one hand, Cover distinguishes the paideic or
world-creating “strong” forces; on the other hand, the imperial or world-maintaining 
“weak” forces (at 12-3). In this section I will explain what he means by these, how they 
relate to one another, and what Cover is reaching at through them. So what does it mean 
to say that the paideic and the imperial are two “ideal-typical patterns of combining 
corpus, discourse, and interpersonal commitment?” Are they forces that coexist in every 
nomos though perhaps in different measure? Or are they rather forms of combining the 
constitutive elements of the nomos that give rise to different types of nomos?
63 Joseph Caro comments on an apparent discrepancy between Simeon the Just and Rabbi Simeon ben 
Gamaliel about the three pillars that hold the (Jewish) normative world: according to the first the world 
stands upon the Torah, temple worship, and deeds of kindness; according to the latter, it stands upon 
justice, truth, and peace. Caro explains the discrepancy by arguing that unlike Simeon the Just, Rabbi 
Simeon ben Gamaliel spoke only after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Caro’s conclusion is 
that the world was created on the basis of the three principles of Simeon the Just, but after it had already 
been created, it could continue to exist upon the basis of Rabbi Simeon ben Gamaliel’s three. What is 
relevant about Caro’s insight is not, I think, the identification of particular values—although Cover is 
quick to point out the similarity of the world-maintaining values of Simeon ben Gamaliel and the 
“universalist virtues that we have come to identify with modern liberalism”—but rather the identification 
of two very different kinds of forces: one to create the world, another to maintain it, for “there is a 
difference between the [force needed for the] preservation of that which already exists and the [force 
needed for the] initial realization of that which had not earlier existed at all.” [Joseph Caro, Beit Yosef at 
Tur: Hoshen Mishpat 1, in Cover, Nomos and Narrative, at 12, the parenthetic thoughts are Cover’s 
own]. 
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Before anything, we must clarify that Cover is not speaking of types of societies 
or normative communities, but of “ideal types” in the Weberian sense.64 Ideal types are 
methodological constructs devised with the aim of understanding a given social 
phenomenon from within. They are created by selecting salient features of observable 
phenomena, by classifying them into types, and by assigning to each an underlying 
meaning-pattern from which to interpret the internal rationality of the phenomenon 
under observation. This process is ideal not in the usual sense of idyllic but in two other 
senses: first, in that the selection of salient features, the classification into different 
types, and the attribution of distinct patterns of signification make the whole process 
necessarily sketchy; and second, in that the types claim to correspond to reality ideally.
As Cover says, his use of the paideic and imperial types aims not to represent this or that 
concrete attribute of a given normative world, but rather to “[isolate] in discourse the 
coexisting bases … of all normative worlds” (at 14). Thus, it is not to find fault in the 
types but to note their expected behavior that “no normative world has been created or 
maintained wholly in either the paideic or the imperial mode” (id.). Provided that one 
does not lose sight of their scope and range of action, ideal types allow the observer to 
penetrate complex human and social phenomena, which then must be contrasted with 
the necessarily richer reality. Indeed, ideal types “touch” reality at the moment when 
they are being created, as well as later, when they are trying to explain it. This has a 
curious effect that must be noted. As we shall see, depending on the social reality that 
one wants to explain—and our own coordinates within it— ideal types may be used to 
signify different things. Thus, whether one wants to explain the inner life of an 
 
64 About Max Weber’s ideal types and their application to law, see R. COTTERRELL, THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, Butterworths, London (1984). 
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individual nomos or to compare it with others in the broader normative space, the 
paideic and imperial will seem, respectively, either to coexist within every nomos, or to 
characterize one nomos but not another. In the former case, they act as active principles 
enlivening each and every nomos; in the latter, they are distinctive ways of organizing 
the nomos and give rise to different types of nomos.
Once this methodological concern has been clarified, we can concentrate on 
Cover’s analysis. In his description, the paideic is a way of combining corpus, discourse, 
and commitment—the constitutive elements of the nomos—characterized by the strong 
sense of integration, cohesion, and purpose of its inhabitants. According to Cover, the 
term suggests: (1) a common body of precept and narrative, (2) a common and personal 
way of being educated into this corpus, and (3) a sense of direction or growth (at 12-13). 
The use of the Greek word paideia (which can be translated as culture, education or 
even as “cultural education”) is especially appropriate, for, as Werner Jaeger describes, 
paideia is not only the content of the education that is transmitted—its episteme—but 
also the principles that direct this acculturation, as well as the action of learning itself.65 
This point will prove to be quite important when applied to the nomos, because the 
paideic is both the normative impulse that gives direction to the nomos, as well as the 
particular outcome derived from it. The Greek genealogy is also suitable because for a 
long time the Greeks lacked an official or statist education, yet managed to create, 
maintain, and pass on a significant body of their common normative lore from one 
generation to the next—informality yet assurance of continuity that Cover wants to 
 
65 Insofar as it also encompasses not only the principle but the action of learning itself, the paideia of a 
culture is broader than the Foucauldian concept of episteme [THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1966), English trans. 1970)]. See Werner Jaeger’s 
seminal study PAIDEIA, supra note 16. Cover cites Jaeger’s work several times in the course of Nomos 
and Narrative.
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suggest also in regards to the paideic type of nomos.66 In short, the paideic can be 
defined as the purposeful molding of the individual character into the normative 
universe of that community. In this regard, Cover points out the initiatory, celebratory, 
and performative nature of these pedagogical practices (at 13). Also, he stresses that the 
reliance on a common corpus, shared narratives, and strong interpersonal bonds confer 
upon the members of the paideic nomos a sense of  
belonging and location “in relation to the cosmos, to its neighbors, [and] to the natural 
world” (at 14).  
Opposite to the paideic, Cover identifies the imperial or the world-maintaining 
weak forces (at 12-13). Not surprisingly, the imperial is marked rather by the absence of 
a common corpus that is taught, believed in, and recognized as the moving normative 
force of the community (at 14). Cover describes the imperial as grounded upon 
minimalist interpersonal obligations, expressed through norms that need not be shared 
as long as they are effective, and premised upon a discourse that aims not at personal 
expression but at objectivity (at 13). Whereas the paideic can be said to be generative 
and celebratory, the imperial serves in contrast to inhibit the unruly creative impulse of 
the nomos (at 13, n. 35). As Cover puts it, “the sober imperial mode of world 
maintenance holds the mirror of critical objectivity to meaning, [and] imposes the 
discipline of institutional justice upon norms” (at 16). This is why Cover states that, if 
the paideic may be associated with the idea of law as social meaning, the imperial 
alludes rather to the idea of law as social control (at 10 and 12-19).  
 
66 Note here that we are already making the move from one perspective to the other, and have used the 
paideic type first to explain the inner workings of any given nomos and then to characterize its kind 
(which can potentially separate it from another).    
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One problem often associated with the use of ideal types is their disjointed and 
stationary character. Nothing further from their use here, Cover understands the paideic 
and the imperial to exist in a mutually dynamic interaction. This idea connects with the 
never-ending cycle of legal meaning described in the previous section, but now within a 
more precise structure. At this point, Cover introduces his biological model for the 
process of norm-generation or, as he appropriately labels it, jurisgenesis. The 
jurisgenetic sequence shows that one ideal pattern grows naturally from the other in a 
process that can only be called “organic.” As every other living organism, one can say, 
the highly compact paideic nomos undergoes the continuous mutation of its constitutive 
cells. The duplication and reduplication of legal meaning by which thousands of further 
meanings emerge out of the same genetic code is what Cover refers to as “juridical 
mitosis” (at 15).67 This process is continuous and unstoppable, and without the existence 
of a counteracting principle, its very potency68 would endanger the continued existence 
of the nomos. Thus, says Cover, “it is the multiplicity of meaning—the fact that never 
only one but always many worlds are created by the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis—
that leads at once to the imperial virtues and the imperial mode of world maintenance” 
(at 16). Without the sobering influence of the imperial mode, the worlds created solely 
in a paideic mode would be “unstable and sectarian in their social organization, 
dissociative and incoherent in their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions” 
(id.). And we can only imagine the sclerotic rigidity of a world operating exclusively in 
the imperial mode. In effect, the imperial imposes coherence “upon the fertile but 
 
67 The biological analogy is intentional: technically, the process of mitosis is the process of duplication 
and reduplication of chromosomes. Cover speaks of legal DNA to refer to the commonality of meaning 
that stands at the center of the nomos and makes possible its further reproduction. 
68 Cover uses the term “jurispotence” (at 15). 
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weakly organized jurisgenerative cells,” but such a principle is by itself “incapable of 
producing the normative meaning that is life and growth” (at 16). Arguably, the paideic 
and the imperial are interdependent and mutually effecting synergetic forces, jointly 
necessary for the healthy functioning of the normative body.  
 This notwithstanding, once we shy away from the nomos, individually 
considered, and set our sight on the variety of nomic entities populating the normative 
territory, the paideic and the imperial ideal types can also be used to characterize diverse 
types of nomos. Not without realizing this fundamental shift of perspective are we in a 
position to assess Cover’s following claim: he affirms that in the context of the modern 
nation-state, the social organization of state law—the most sophisticated normative 
manifestation of modern societies—has approximated the imperial type, whereas the 
social organization of the smallish normative groups has approximated the paideic.69 
Again, this is not to say that the law of the State is just imperial, or that the State is by 
nature incapable of speaking in paideic language.70 Cover states quite clearly that “any
nomos must be paideic to the extent that it contains within it the commonalities of 
meaning that make continued normative activity possible” (at 14, emphasis added). 
There is no contradiction here: to the extent that the State avails everyday normative 
life, it must contain within it the germs of the paideic. However, Cover argues that 
modern states are no longer capable of the level of cohesion, integration, and purpose 
that characterize the paideic. In its place, other smallish communities—religious groups, 
social movements, movements for legal and political reform—have taken up the task of 
 
69 Cover (at 16) speaks explicitly about the modern nation-state, although he then circumscribes his 
assertion to the state he knows most, the United States. The fact that I come from a different State and 
legal tradition yet feel perfectly at home with his depiction of the “state-of-(legal)-affairs” makes me 
suspect that his statement covers much more territory than he cares to vindicate.   
70 Neither does the paideic cease in front of the State (at 11 n. 30). 
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providing individuals with a rich texture of normative action and significance. In these, 
Cover suggests, “that which must be done … and the sources of common commitment 
to the doing of it stand bare, in need of no explanation … obvious at once and to all” 
(at 14). It is precisely this promise of a “shared sense of a revealed, transparent 
normative order” (id.) which the modern state can no longer deliver.  
Before presenting Cover’s defining conclusion, two potential distractions must 
be dispelled. First, eloquences such as “pure and revealed transparent normative order” 
should not make us lose sight of the fact that Cover’s communities are not grounded on 
“essences” such as blood, race, or ethnic origin. Cover speaks rather about “intentional 
communities” (at 14), by which he means those communities “whose members believe 
… to have common meanings for the normative dimensions of their common lives”  
(at 14-15, emphasis added). Furthermore, the imagined integration that stands at their 
center is just that, an imagined integration: “the unification of meaning that stands at its 
center exists only for an instant, and that instant is itself imaginary” (at 15).71 Certainly, 
“differences arise immediately about the meaning of creeds, the content of common 
worship, the identity of those who are brothers and sisters” (id.). This is why the longing 
for an absolute pure essence is but a chimera: “Were there some pure paideic normative 
order for a fleeting moment, a philosopher would surely emerge to challenge the illusion 
of its identity with truth” (id.). The second concern is about the idyllic aspect of Cover’s 
idea of the communal life. In light of many passages of Nomos and Narrative, it seems 
obstinate to deny that some idealization exists. However, Cover acknowledges that 
paideic communities often make use of coercive mechanisms to assure and maintain the 
 
71 This does not mean that it has no real implications: “the imagined instant of unified meaning is like a 
seed, a legal DNA, a genetic code … for a thousand real integrations of corpus, discourse, and 
commitment” (at 15). 
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perceived unity and coherence of the group. As one clear negative example, he mentions 
the case of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in which “the holistic integrity of the colony 
was maintained by exclusion and expulsion” (at 16 n. 41). And as it was hinted earlier, 
Cover is not unaware the social groups can be “sectarian,” “dissociative,” “wary,” and 
“violent” (at 16).    
If both smallish communities and State are paideic to some extent, and both 
State and groups do also exercise certain imperial prerogatives, what is exactly the state 
of affairs to which Cover wants us to direct our attention? Probing into this question will 
help us to understand one of the crucial concerns of Nomos and Narrative. First of all, 
the association of State law with the imperial mode of norm-articulation suggests that 
the law of the State no longer avails its citizens with the kind of normative activity that 
molds their character and galvanizes social action. As Cover says speaking in the 
context of American Constitutionalism, “authoritative precept may be national in 
character … but the meaning of such a text is always ‘essentially contested’ in the 
degree to which this meaning is related to the diverse and divergent traditions within the 
nation.”72 Even were one version of the story to be declared authoritative, affirms 
Cover, “alternative stories still provide normative bases for the growth of distinct 
constitutional worlds” (at 19). This in itself may not be a problem, and some would 
argue not without reason that it is rather a virtue of modern liberal democracies that they 
 
72 Cover writes in this regard: “All Americans share a national text in the first or thirteenth or fourteenth 
amendment, but we do not share an authoritative narrative regarding its significance. And even were we 
to share some single authoritative account of the framing of the text—even if we had a national history 
declared by law to be authoritative—we could not share the same account relating each of us as an 
individual to that history. Some of us would claim Frederick Douglass as a father, some Abraham 
Lincoln, and some Jefferson Davis. […] Thus, the narrative strand integrating who we are and what we 
stand for with the patterns of precept would differ even when were we to possess a canonical narrative 
text” (at 17-18). As I said earlier (supra note 69), these observations apply to contexts way beyond 
American constitutionalism.  
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“disclaim control over narrative.”73 However, Cover notes an additional phenomenon 
that complicates things exceptionally, I believe. It is part of the common lore of the legal 
profession—and thus “only partially enforced in practice, but fully operative in theory” 
(at 16)—that the State is thought to entertain the monopoly in the determination of what 
counts as law. As Cover says, “the precepts we call law are marked off by strict social 
control over their provenance” (at 17) and thought to respond to a pattern of nested 
consistency (at 17-8).74 This means that, in spite of its inability to generate a paideic 
nomos of its own, the State is still believed to retain, and to have the right to retain, 
absolute dominion in the determination of law. This creates the paradoxical situation 
that, on the one hand, normative manifestations that do not come from the State are 
dispossessed of legal status, while on the other hand, the law of the State does not live 
up to the promise of providing normative life with meaning. This leads to Cover’s main 
argument. As he puts it, “[t]he conclusion emanating from this state of affairs is simple 
and very disturbing,” says Cover: “there is a radical dichotomy between the social 
organization of law as power and the organization of law as meaning” (at 18). Again 
one may want to ask what exactly makes this situation so disturbing. The key word here 
is, I think, dichotomy. If our analysis showed that both paideutic and imperial forces are 
necessary for the maintenance of a healthy living organism, the systematic repression of 
the former becomes symptomatic of a grave social illness. Insofar as law’s generative, 
enlightening, and educative function is subdued, the ability of law to function as a 
 
73 In the context of modern pluralistic societies, one may think that it would create more problems than it 
would solve if suddenly the State would adopt a strong paideutic attitude. One need not to be reminded of 
the excesses of States that adopt an ultra-nationalistic grand narrative. I shall argue, however, that Cover 
is not advocating a return to any such statist paideia.
74 The common places cited by Cover here are J. GRAY (THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE 
LAW (1909) and H.L.A. HART (supra note 29). Cover argues further that despite Dworkin’s criticism of 
Hart (supra note 51), Dworkin “does not deny the social control over precept articulation that I am 
positing here” (at 17 n. 44).  
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bridge between a given state of affairs and its imagined betterment is undermined, if not 
eradicated. Cover is not alone in thinking this quite distressing. 
 
II. CONFRONTING THE OTHER: IMAGINING A CONSTITUTIONAL 
COSMOS  
Thus far we have spoken of single and self-enclosed normative worlds (at 19), 
but the socio-legal cosmos is populated by heterogeneous nomic entities. Thus, from the 
world of one, we must move now to the world of two. If the analogy of the living 
organism serves Cover to describe the patterns of reproduction, transmission, and 
preservation of each individual nomos, the metaphor of the cosmos serves him now to 
imagine the space wherein heterogeneous nomoi coexist and relate to each other at any 
given point in time.  
Cover draws a distinction between two ways of interacting with the outer world 
(i.e., other nomoi). The first he calls insular; the second redemptive. These two ideal-
types75 are defined by the relationship between groups and their socio-legal 
environment, or to put it differently, by the way each group comes to terms with the 
“ontological reality of the other” (at 29).76 Cover discusses the insular and redemptive 
types in connection to the task of constitutional meaning-formation. At this point, one 
may wonder why he chooses to place the Constitution at the center of his analysis. 
Certainly, it cannot be because the Constitution declares itself to be the supreme law of 
 
75 Cover sometimes speaks of insular and redemptive communities, and for convenience, sometimes so 
will I, but properly we should keep in mind that they are “ideal types” in the sense described above (or as 
he also calls them “interpretive trajectories,” at 60) and not concrete communities. 
76 Cover argues that these heterogeneous nomoi—each of which claim their own sense of meaning—
effect each other through human contact. Each nomos is, as a result, “a force, like gravity, through which 
our worlds exercise an influence upon one another” (at 9).  
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the land, for such a self-referential clause does not bind the nomoi that do not recognize 
it as such. However, Cover notes that “many of our necessarily uncanonical historical 
narratives treat the Constitution as foundational—a beginning—and generative of all 
that comes after” (at 25).77 If true, pragmatic but not political reasons appear to justify 
why the Constitution should be given such a prominent place. Indeed, as a matter of 
historical and sociological argument, one may find reasons to support that “the 
Constitution is a widespread, though not universally accepted basis for interpretations; it 
is a center about which many communities teach, learn, and tell stories” (at 25).  
Such an explanation, however, does not engage groups for whom the 
Constitution is not at the center of their teachings. In fact, the lack of a single text to 
which all groups owe allegiance compromises any theory that would place a particular 
text as its stepping stone.78 However, I find an additional argument to defend Cover’s 
focus on constitutional meaning-formation. Arguably, one might think of constitutional 
meaning not as the task of determining the meaning of the constitutional text, but rather 
as the activity through which distinct nomoi engage in determining what counts as the 
fundamental text (or texts) in their respective communities. In other words, the 
construction of constitutional meaning is the task of working out the text, texts, and 
accompanying narratives that are to be taken as the fundamental, and hence 
 
77 “This is true,” affirms Cover with the American context in mind, “even though the Constitution must 
compete with natural law, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the 
Revolution itself for primacy in the narrative tradition” (at 25). 
78 Cover finds a way to respond to this concern based on what he calls the “interconnectedness of legal 
meaning” (at 33). According to this argument, all normative groups inhabit a common cosmos which 
forces them to interact whether they like it or not, and where one is forced to take into account the 
normative world presented by the other. This entails that when groups for whom the Constitution is not 
central encounter groups for whom it is, the rhetorical configuration of their engagement forces the 
former to take into account the latter (namely the Constitution). In this rhetorical context both are 
engaged with the same constitutional text. I find this argument illuminating, but by itself insufficient to 
prioritize any one single text, whatever that might be.       
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constitutional, in that community. In this task the (State) Constitution may be just one 
among many—certainly not the only—legal instruments to be considered. In addition to 
pragmatic reasons, then, one can articulate epistemic and hermeneutic arguments to 
wanting to comprehend the actual development of a constitutional cosmos; in this light, 
one could say without inconsistency that in one way or another, nomic groups are “all 
engaged in the task of constitutional understanding” (at 33).  
 
II. 1. Insular Constitutionalism
Insular communities are those who create some sort of “nomic refuge” and wish 
to keep it free from external interferences, especially from the State.79 In their social 
organization, insular communities are instituted by a principle of separation that draws 
the boundaries between the inside and the outside. “The principle of separateness is 
constitutive and jurisgenerative” (at 29). In other words, “[i]t is not only a principle 
limiting the [S]tate, but also one constitutive of a distinct nomos within the domain left 
open” (at 29). As a result, these groups “inhabit an ongoing nomos that must be marked 
off by a normative boundary from the realm of civil coercion” (at 28).  
Cover draws from the scholarship of Carol Weisbrod and others to illustrate 
how, from time to time, insular communities utilize well-known legal instruments to 
create and emerge as an entire nomos, that is, as “an integrated world of obligation and 
reality from which the rest of the world is perceived” (at 31).80 For example, he 
mentions how nineteenth century utopian communities used freedom of contract as a 
 
79 From the perspective of insular communities, the State is perceived more as a historical contingency in 
which they happen to find themselves (at 27 and 31 in fine) than as the logical culmination of primeval 
societies, as in the contractarian tradition, or in historicist accounts such as Hegel’s. 
80 Cover cites the example of Massachusetts Bay Colony.  
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ground for their nomic insularity; or how property and corporation have been bases for 
company town, mine, or plant, often to assert a right to law creation and enforcement 
with respect to social relations (at 31). What Cover wants us to notice, however, is not 
the concrete legal instrument utilized, but how it grows from there to become not one 
among many available legal instruments, but the rule around which the normative 
activity of the group revolves. In effect, the utilized legal instrument—whether it be 
contract, free exercise of religion, property, or corporation law—becomes the boundary 
rule upon which the group stands apart and constitutes its world.81 
It is important to remark that the meaning of the boundary rule differs ostensibly 
depending on the side of the wall we are on. From the point of view of state doctrine, a 
simple way to interpret the group’s normative activity is through the lens of liberty of 
association (at 32). However, to assimilate the jurisgenerative capacity of each nomos to 
the doctrine of associational rights is, according to Cover, to assume ourselves the 
perspective of the state official looking out (at 32). This we ought not lightly to do, says 
Cover, because from without—or from within another normative world—, the nomos of
the officialdom is also particular (at 33). In other words, to frame this normative activity 
solely within the logic of liberty of association is anything but neutral; rather, it is a 
move charged with heavy political implications. It does not take much to realize that 
“the State’s explicit or implicit acknowledgement of a limited sphere of autonomy is 
understood from within the association to be the State’s accommodation to the extant 
reality of nomian separation” (at 32). To state it clearly, nomic entities do not need the 
 
81 Through a process of normative mitosis, says Cover, “[a] world is turned inside out; a wall begins to 
form, and its shape differs depending upon which side of the wall our narratives place us on” (at 31). 
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State’s recognition or permission to exist and to generate their own normative activity.82 
But even more importantly, considering that not only the meaning but also the 
significance of the boundary rule differs depending on which side of the wall we are on, 
to adopt a single statist perspective may also be epistemically misguided: as Cover 
writes, “[f]rom a secular perspective on the Constitution, the free exercise clause’s 
creation of small dedicated, nomic refuges appear to be merely an (unimportant) 
accommodation to religious autonomy. But for the Mennonites, the clause is the axis on 
which the wheel of history turns” (at 30 n. 85).83 Arguably then, each nomos establishes 
itself as the Archimedean point from which to observe the rest of the world and, often, 
incorporate explicit rules establishing the self-referential supremacy of its own system 
(at 30 and 43).84 An important methodological principle seems to derive here: in order to 
understand in full the interactions between distinct nomic entities, the critic must be 
willing to shift her position from one perspective to the other. 
Cover’s characterization of insular communities endowed with collective nomic 
autonomy85 may be impugned on two separate grounds. In what concerns the internal 
aspects of the group, first, it may project a vision of homogeneity that does not 
 
82 In spite of it, Cover states that it would be absurd not to concede the practical benefits of securing the 
acquiescence of the State officials (at 43). 
83 This is true not of the Mennonites, but of many normative conflicts around the world: for reasons of 
personal proximity, this touches the core constitutional controversy between Basque autonomists and 
Spanish centralists. The best scholarly exposition of the Basque nomos is MIGUEL HERRERO DE 
MIÑON’S DERECHO HISTÓRICOS Y CONSTITUCIÓN, Taurus, Madrid, 1998.   
84 As Cover says, “[t]his norm-generating autonomy might be formally granted in charter language. It 
might be implicit in a principle of religious liberty, freedom of contract, or protection of property. 
Typically, however, communities with a total-life vision, a nomos entirely of their own, find their own 
charters for the norm-generating aspects of their collective lives” (at 31-32, footnotes omitted). This self-
referential supremacy is mitigated, assures us Cover, “by the partly principled, partly prudential rules of 
deference that each manifests in relation to the other” (at 30). 
85 Cover insists that his description of norm-creating capacities of the groups is not amenable to the logic 
of individual rights, nor is it a variant of the distinction, often found in liberal legal doctrine, between 
(individual) titularity and (collective) exercise. In Cover’s view, the only way to make full sense of these 
“rights” is to think of them as pertaining to the group as a collective, I would suggest, as the State’s right 
to impose punishment does not make sense any other way. 
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adequately represent (unless it otherwise represses) the necessarily heterogeneous 
composition of every human collective.86 Moreover, the very idea that a group may have 
a discernible identity may also be doubted. I can think of two lines of argument to help 
us soften this kind of criticism. The first is to notice that projecting an identity often 
comes encapsulated within a claim for recognition—social, political, religious, 
economical. Thus, the group’s self-portrayed identity is shaped by the rhetorical need to 
present itself as distinct from an outer world and as entitled to respect, precisely because 
of this difference. In the interests of presenting such a claim, the likely heterogeneity of 
the group’s internal beliefs, myths, and narratives may be sacrificed, it is true. This is 
why it is important to bear in mind that “the unification of meaning that stands at [the 
group’s] center exists only for an instant, and the instant is itself imaginary” (at 14). 
Behind closed doors, the image of the group may be considerably or altogether different.  
Still, is not ascribing an identity to groups already to commit an ontological 
fallacy? In other words, what kind of identity can we legitimately ascribe to groups? 
Cover’s nomic groups share a common body of narratives, myths, and language, it 
appears, but these are bound together by their belief in forming such a group  
(at 15). This suggests that, insofar as the members of a group think of themselves as a 
group, they are self-conscious of their own identity, which they help to institute by this 
very act (at 50 n. 137). Arguably, the bare commonalities of the group are not enough to 
constitute identity properly. For it to be perfected those commonalities must be affirmed 
by a self-reflexive act. Let me argue this point in connection to Paul Ricoeur’s theory on 
 
86 For a development of this argument, see J. Resnik, supra note 8. Certainly, Cover focuses above all on 
the commonalities that confer a sense of unity to the group. 
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the reflexive constitution of subjectivity.87 The author explains that personal identity is 
properly constituted when the self can think of itself as an other.88 For Ricoeur, identity 
is an attributive and relational concept, and links certain qualities and actions to 
whoever answers with his or her personal name to the question, “Who”?89 Likewise, by 
thinking of themselves as groups, Cover’s communities seem able to respond with the 
first plural personal pronoun “we” when they are addressed, questioned, or threatened. 
This way they attribute to themselves (and we can attribute to them) a collective 
identity.      
A second, quite different ground for criticism has to do not with the internal 
aspects of the group, but with its relations with the exterior. To speak of insular 
communities gives the impression that the group is hermetically sealed or uninfluenced 
by the outer world, which seems quite an untenable position in our era of global 
communications and networks. Far from it, Cover states quite explicitly that no group 
can manage a total breakthrough with the outside world: “Neither religious churches, 
however small and dedicated, nor utopian communities, however isolated, nor cadres of 
judges, however independent, can ever manage a total break from other groups with 
other understandings of law” (at 33). Although to speak about communities does 
inevitably entail some level of differentiation, Cover points out many areas of overlap 
and mutual influence. For instance, Cover notes that “the Amish concept of church-state 
relations is not entirely independent of secular, libertarian concepts of such relations” 
 
87 Ricoeur develops the idea of the identity-ipse (the self that thinks of itself “as an other”) as 
complementary to the more common concept of identity-idem (the identical to oneself, or what is thought 
to define oneself as opposed to another person). See PAUL RICOEUR, SOI-MEME COMME UN 
AUTRE, Seuil, Paris (1990).  
88 Like Cover, Ricoeur stresses the importance of narrative in this task. 
89 Ricoeur, supra note 87.  
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(id.). However, Cover stresses the fact that “each group must accommodate in its own 
normative world the objective reality of the other” (at 29). This is not to be seen only as 
a form of ethical or political response to otherness, but as a far more fundamental 
ontological recognition of the intersubjective constitution of the self: the 
acknowledgement that personal identity is partly constituted by the other, and vice 
versa.  
In sum, despite these caveats—as well as those that stem from the use of an 
ideal-type—one can still conclude with Cover that insular communities 
“characteristically construct their own myths, lay down their own precepts, and presume 
to establish their own hierarchies of norm. More importantly, they identify their own 
paradigms of lawful behavior and reduce the state to just one element, albeit an 
important one, in the normative environment” (at 33). 
 
II. 2. Redemptive Constitutionalism
Cover writes: “[p]eople associate not only to transform themselves, but also to 
change the social world in which they live” (at 34). The ideal type that Cover labels 
“redemptive” refers to those associations whose sharply different visions of the social 
order require a transformational politics that cannot be contained within their own 
autonomous insularity (id.). The transformation of the conditions of social life is in fact 
their very raison d’être (at 39).  
The term “redemptive,” Cover acknowledges, bears a heavy weight of meaning, 
but he deems it appropriate to the deeply religious, personal and cosmic connotations 
distinguishing these from other less integral or holistic reformist movements (at 34-5). 
48
Redemptive movements set out to liberate persons and the law, and to raise them from a 
fallen state (at 35). Accordingly, says Cover, redemption postulates: (1) the 
unredeemable character of reality as we know it, (2) the fundamentally different reality 
that should take its place, and (3) the replacement of the one with the other (at 34). It 
can be said that if insular communities want the rest of the world not to interfere with 
their world, redemptive groups want the world to change to reflect theirs. Thus, the 
internal structure of redemptive groups differs from that of insular communities. This is 
so because, “any group that seeks the transformation of the surrounding social world 
must evolve a mechanism for such a change,” including, for instance, some sort of 
consciousness-raising, a form of deliberative politics, and a certain apostolic ministry  
(id.). 
 As illustration, Cover takes the example of the radical constitutionalists during 
the antislavery era.90 In a manner diametrically opposed to that of the insular 
Garrisonians—who believed that a Constitution which upheld slavery ought not to be 
obeyed, and who did not feel committed to obeying it—radical constitutionalists 
declared that no word could be found in the Constitution that authorized the practice of 
slavery (at 38). In Cover’s view, it is not that the radical constitutionalists were unaware 
of historical and legal reality, but rather, that they chose to embrace a vision “in which 
the entire order of American slavery would be without foundation in law” (id., footnote 
omitted). Radical constitutionalists hoped to transform the constitutional order to reflect 
their vision opposing slavery, and therefore, an alternative like the Garrisonians’ 
acceptance of what the officialdom declared to be the meaning of the Constitution 
seemed almost like a dereliction of duty. 
 
90 Another example Cover analyzes is civil disobedience during the civil rights movement.    
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As one can immediately perceive, the strength of such an interpretive move is, at 
the same time, its major weakness. For the radical constitutionalist view to cohere,    
“its adherent must either give up his connections with what is the case, including the 
predictable patterns of behavior of other actors, or give up the vision” (at 39). Moreover, 
the redemptive ambition of the constitutionalists could not content itself with finding a 
safe haven for runaway slaves—as may have been the case of the Garrisonians—but 
necessitated instead the full power of the state to destroy, altogether, all safe havens for 
slave owners. These reasons make redemptive narratives extremely unstable and prone 
to an ephemeral existence. In spite of the short-lived historical experience of the radical 
constitutionalists, Cover vindicates that their efforts were extremely productive and 
contributed to the overall growth of law. Cover says, among other things, that, in 
mounting their attack upon slavery from the general structure of the Constitution, they 
developed arguments for “extending the range of constitutional sources to include at 
least the Declaration of Independence” (at 39).   
This being said, the idea of groups trying to redeem the world to reflect their 
particular view of heaven is liable to produce some political vertigo. In particular, not 
everyone is likely to share their absolute sense of pressing urgency, approve of the acts 
of martyrdom to which they may give rise, or welcome the mandatory evangelization of 
ideals. Certainly, not every group attempting to redeem society may be as commendable 
as the anti-slavery movement; and we may do well to protect ourselves from intolerant 
sects that want us simply to submit to their swords.91 At the same time, it may be 
advisable to grow a healthy sense of distrust for groups that want to model the face of 
the world on their own image (especially when they claim to have a direct—and often 
 
91 As Cover puts it, insular associations are “shields,” but redemptive associations are “swords” (at 33).  
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exclusive—line to divinity). Although Cover does not often show this attitude himself, 
he gives us some pointers to help us to develop it ourselves.92 
First of all, there are limits inherent in Cover’s definition of law. In effect, “if 
law reflects a tension between what is and what might be, law can be maintained only as 
long as the two are close enough to reveal a line of human endeavor that brings them 
into temporary or partial reconciliation” (at 39). This means that if and when the line is 
broken—not unlikely, considering the difficulties involved in transforming their total 
vision into reality—they cease being movements of the law (at 39). In other words, the 
more these groups distance themselves from the realm of social reality and the 
predictable behavior of other actors, the more likely they are to inhabit the realm of 
“mere utopianism”, i.e., the world without (legal) influence.93 
The second set of limits arises from Cover’s pluralistic understanding of the 
social world and the imperatives derived from the mutually effecting nature of social 
interactions. As Cover says, “just like living in the economic world entails an 
understanding of price, so living in the normative world entails an understanding of the 
measures of commitment to norms in the face of contrary commitments of others”  
(at 53). This is to say, on the one hand, that the group must be cognizant of the existence 
of other actors that will likely oppose it, but more importantly, that such likely 
opposition does ultimately affect the group’s own normative options. For example, each 
 
92 In the last paragraph of Nomos and Narrative (at 68) Cover states quite unequivocally that it is with an 
attitude of distrust that we must approach the norm-generating capacities of these groups (yet realizing at 
the same time that, regardless of what we may think of them, they will undoubtedly continue to exist, and 
to create law).  
93 This is what ultimately happened with the radical constitutionalists, Cover reports: they became 
increasingly sectarian and finally dissolved (at 38-39). To be dismissed as “merely” utopian, Cover says, 
is the result not of presenting radically different standards of living, but rather of the failure to present 
them as “real” or “livable”; or, in Cover’s words, “because they fail to posit alternative lives to which we 
would commit ourselves by stretching from our reality toward their vision” (at 44, footnote omitted).     
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group may have created narratives of resistance in which maintaining the primacy of its 
nomos above all the rest require its members to resist contrary normative worlds. 
However, when violence ensues effectively (or is very likely to ensue), the group must 
decide how it will respond to it. This requires, says Cover, a new elaboration of its own 
nomos (at 49). In other words, “the development of an understanding of what is right 
and just in the violent contexts that the group will encounter” (id.). Consequently, even 
when from the outside it may seem that narratives of redemption are particularly prone 
to “impel a man … to rise up in arms against any law whatever that he happens not to 
like,”94 texts of resistance “are always subject to an interpretation process that limits the 
situations in which resistance is a legitimate response” (at 50). Cover remarks that, at 
first, the Declaration of Independence seems to confer the inalienable and 
unencumbered right to resist. Yet, this text goes on to concede to prudence “that we 
must ‘suffer, while evils are sufferable’ [and acknowledge] that ‘a decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind’ imposes upon us an obligation carefully to recount the reasons 
that led to the decision to resist” (at 49, citations in the original).  
Finally, another limit is suggested by what we may call deontic boundaries: 
means of resistance that are violent in the extreme are, perhaps, incompatible with 
(because destructive of) legal meaning. In the context of the American political order, 
Cover says, actions such as guerrilla warfare and terrorism may go beyond legitimate 
normative action (at 52).95 
94 Quoting J. Bentham in reference to the American Declaration of Independence, in A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT 149 (1776), in Cover, at 50. 
95 It is not clear, however, whether these limits apply in all times and places. It may well be the case that 
in some extreme circumstances violence is the most reasonable form of resistance. As Cover appears to 
confirm: “resistance”—which may include violent resistance—“is not evil per se; its merits depend upon 
what is resisted and upon the quality of the rebel’s hermeneutic of resistance” (at 54 n. 146).     
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III. THE PATHOS OF JUDGMENT: EXPLORING THE DIMENSION OF 
JUSTICE 
III. 1. Hard Cases
With so many disparate groups that occupy (and that want to occupy) the 
normative realm, the existence of clashes cannot be altogether surprising. So far, we 
have considered the State just as another particular nomos, but now we must face the 
organs of the State in another capacity, that of adjudicators of conflict. Cover is often 
quoted for having said that courts are jurispathic because they kill off the law; what is 
less known—or at least not sufficiently recognized—is that this statement is part of a 
serious undertaking to reconceptualize the so-called “hard cases.” In order to assess 
Cover’s originality (or lack thereof), some general background is necessary. 
 In Chapter Seven of The Concept of Law,96 H. L. A. Hart famously argued that, 
due to the open texture of language there were cases that could not be clearly subsumed 
under the terms of the rule. To these, he opposed the situations in which “the language 
used [in the rule] fixes necessary conditions which anything must satisfy if it is to be 
within its scope” (at 128-9). The latter he called clear, or paradigmatic cases; the former 
are those we know as hard. For instance, Hart explained that it is clear that the rule 
prohibiting vehicles in the park applies to motor-vehicles, but it is less so whether this 
rule applies equally to an electrically powered motorcar (at 126-9). Hart believed that 
hard cases arise because they fall within the zone of penumbra of rules, where he 
recognized judges could use their discretion to fill in the gaps. However, he also thought 
 
96 HART, supra note 29.   
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that these cases were exceptional, and believed that in most cases language left no doubt 
as to which cases were meant to fall within its scope and which were not.97 
Against this canonical view, it has been sometimes argued that the distinction 
between easy and hard cases lends itself to being problematized.98 If applicable at all, 
some argue, the line is blurry and not fixable in advance.99 In addition, the source of 
hardness has been found not in semantic reasons, but in substantive or other pragmatic 
circumstances.100 For one, Dworkin believes that “a hard case is a situation in the law 
that gives rise to genuine argument about the truth of a proposition of law that cannot be 
resolved by recourse to a set of plain facts determinative of the issue.”101 
Several questions must be distinguished. On the one hand, we want to know 
when we are in front of a hard case; on the other hand, we also want to know why it is 
that the case is hard.102 In addition, when in front of a hard case we will also ask what 
the task ahead of the judge is, and finally, how she ought to proceed in performing it. 
From what we gather, Hart argues that there is a hard case when the law is unclear, and 
the case is hard because the language does not clearly specify whether it falls within the 
 
97 Further, “because we are men, not gods” (at 128), Hart thought it inadvisable to try to make rules the 
application of which would leave no room for further interpretation (at 128 ff.). However, his way of 
pursuing the argument makes it clear to me that he thought this task feasible, if not desirable.
98 See R. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, Harvard Univ. Press (1986), 350-4. 
99 See N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1994 (1st 1978), 197 and ff.; for different ways to categorize the distinction between easy and hard cases, 
see J. BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, 183 ff.  
100 For substantive reasons, see DWORKIN (note 98); for pragmatic reasons, see MACCORMICK (note 
100) and BENGOETXEA (note 99). For an interesting semiotic interpretation of why cases become hard, 
see B. Jackson, Rationalité Consciente et Inconsciente dans la Théorie du Droit et la Science Juridique,
19 REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D’ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES (1987), 1-18. Some authors still defend 
the semantic line of argument [see e.g. A. MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY, 
1992 (2nd ed 2005); and F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford-Oxford Univ. Press, NY (1991); and well-taken criticism of these views by F. ATRIA, ON LAW 
AND LEGAL REASONING, Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland Oregon (2001), 101-22]. 
101 See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN, Edinburgh Univ. Press, Edinburgh (1992), 162.  
102 About the when and the why of hard cases, see ATRIA, supra note 100, 75-6. 
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scope of the rule or not, in which case judges can use their discretion.103 Dworkin thinks 
differently, that we are in front of a hard case when decent arguments can be advanced 
for competing interpretations of a legal point, and that the case is hard because the 
disagreement is substantive, as opposed to merely conceptual. As to the how, while Hart 
suggests that judges can use their discretion, Dworkin denies it and says judges must at 
any rate proceed to find the best law that there is.104 Notwithstanding their notable 
differences, both Hart and Dworkin agree that the task of the judge (the what) is to 
reinstate the unity of a law that is perceived as being compromised.105 
Opposing both, Cover offers a fresh and insightful outlook. In his view, the true 
problem in hard cases is one not of lack of (clear or settled) law, but one of too much 
law. This can be redescribed, in a more technical language, as a problem not of 
indeterminacy, but of multiplicity.106 In Cover’s view, the origin and justification of 
courts lies not in the need for law, but rather, in the need to suppress it (at 40). Cover’s 
argument is well-grounded in myth and history. For example, he notes quite 
perceptively that “in Aeschylus’ literary re-creation of the mythic foundation of the 
Areopagus [the oldest Athenian court], Athena’s establishment of the institutionalized 
law of the polis is addressed to the dilemma of the moral and legal indeterminacy 
created by two laws, one invoked by the Erinyes and the other by Apollo” (id., referring 
 
103 This is also the view of J. Raz, who speaks of “regulated” and “unregulated” cases (RAZ, supra note 
51, chapter 3).    
104 DWORKIN, supra note 51, esp. Chs. 4 and 13. 
105 Dworkin may criticize Hart’s insistence on semantics and discretion, but he still thinks that there is a 
hard case when and because there is uncertainty or disagreement as to what the law is. 
106 Some legal realists also realized that the main issue is the multiplicity of the applicable laws (K. 
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1930-1931) or how to choose 
between different possible major premises (J. Dewey, Logical Method and the Law, 10 CORNELL L. 
QUART. 17 (1924). However, they never went as far as to speak of inter-systemic normative conflicts.   
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to the Oresteia).107 And the reverse phenomenon of “polynomia” occurs, says Cover, 
out of the loss or weakness of courts.108 In many instances, the explicit (historical or 
theoretical) justification for having one “supreme” Court is precisely to produce 
uniformity out of diversity.109 In sum, Cover submits that the fundamental issue is 
therefore not how to apply the law, but the more radical one of which law to apply and 
which law to kill off. This is why, he says, the function of the courts is jurispathic. Let 
us have a closer look at the argument.  
Cover’s particular take on the issue of hard cases is connected to his 
understanding of nomos as a self-legitimating normative world. Consistent with this 
approach, Cover believes that as critics (and by implication also as adjudicators), we 
must posit the nomic integrity of each of the laws in conflict and recognize that, for each 
normative community, the norm articulated is the right response. Failing to do so, Cover 
warns, is to fall victim to the hubris of presupposing the hermeneutic superiority of one 
perspective over another, or to confuse the reality of legal meaning with the status of 
political domination (at 42). Thus, a hard case arises when to a single question of law 
that needs adjudicating there are multiple nomoi, each of which provides its own right 
legal response.110 
On the other hand, the conflict is hard because we are dealing not with divergent 
interpretations of a given legal provision, but with holistic sets of corpuses, myths, and 
narratives. The argument is then not how to square the disagreement with the legal 
 
107 Examples can be multiplied: the issue of deciding which of the laws (mortal or divine) should prevail 
is at the heart of the conflict between Antigone and Creon in Sophocles’ Antigone too. 
108 He mentions the Talmudic example of the Court of the Great Sanhedrin, in which, after the destruction 
of that Court, the Law became two laws (at 41).  
109 Cover cites Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist n. 22, but similar arguments can be found in many 
other jurisdictions.  
110 Many would accept that, potentially, two views can be legally defensible arguments, but that they may 
not be equally right as a matter of law. 
56
system, but how to choose between two competing systems of law. In other words, the 
conflict is inter—and not just intra—systemic. This presents two complementing 
sources of challenge: one is that each normative determination makes sense only from 
within a nomos and in connection to its own structure of meaning, which creates all 
sorts of barriers to mutual understanding and translation between different ones—what 
Cover refers to as the problem of the interpenetrability of traditions (at 17 n. 45).111 But 
more importantly, given that each nomos considers itself to be supreme (and sometimes 
even incorporates clauses to that effect), the main question we must ask ourselves is 
about our own point of reference, which is clearly not a simple interpretive question.112 
Once the problem is seen in this wholly new light, one is likely to agree that 
Hart’s example of the rule prohibiting cars in the park does not even scratch the surface 
of hard cases. Nor is the issue, as it often appears in the literature, one of deciding how 
much leeway or discretion judges have, or are allowed to have. Cover forces us to 
realize that the issue of hard cases is much more complicated than that, and hence the 
name. In order to adjudicate a hard case, one must first acknowledge and be cognizant 
of the existence of a hard case, and this is not always evident. Let me argue this point in 
connection to the place this kind of cases has or ought to have in a theory of 
adjudication. Sometimes it is said that hard cases are a minority and therefore their 
 
111 See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 42; see also J. B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, The 
Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago and London (1990). However, belonging to different traditions does not 
explain why they disagree (see B. BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1993), at 55), nor does this necessarily make a disagreement hard. It is then 
important to stress that, in a hard case situation, groups in conflict are committed to live by and ready to 
fight for their particular normative determination. (To this, we must add the problems derived from the 
potentially uncompromising attitudes of the contestants; the special sensitivity of certain issues; and the 
heavy load of meaning that they usually carry with them.) I think, for instance, of the case of I.R.A. 
prisoners who died hunger striking in British prisons in 1981 (in close temporal proximity with Cover’s 
article), well dramatized in the film Some Mother’s Sons (1996).  
112 We shall deal with what we may call the politics of perspective in the next section. 
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relevance to the whole system should be treated as almost insignificant.113 To respond to 
this claim, it is necessary, though not sufficient, to argue that relevance and significance 
cannot be assessed by statistical or any other purely quantitative method because they 
are inherently qualitative. That is, it is beside the point and adds nothing to the 
discussion to list how many cases are hard.114 Beyond this, one must argue that the 
understanding of hard cases affects not only these but all cases, just like the sociological 
study of deviant cases illuminates not only them, but all the rest.115 Cover argues both. 
His most significant argument is, as we shall have occasion shortly to appreciate, that 
the way a system answers—and sets up mechanisms for answering—a hard case is a 
good barometer of the system as a whole. Furthermore, Cover questions the 
commonplace idea that hard cases are rare occurrences, and quite to the contrary, 
affirms that there may be a potential hard case lurking behind “any normative problem 
of substantial complexity” (at 42). 
In the conflict between the I.R.S. and Bob Jones University, the example Cover 
chooses to analyze (at 62 ff.), it may be tempting to say that it was easy for the IRS to 
rule that racially discriminatory schools such as Bob Jones University are excluded from 
the clause that recognizes tax-exempt status to charitable institutions; but for the 
University, as well as for the Amish, Mennonites, etc… that concurred as amici curiae, 
such definitional fiat is felt as a major attack on their whole nomos and educational 
paideia. The example is instructive for several reasons: for one, because it shows that 
the same case may be easy for one party and hard for the other; but another, more 
 
113 See F. Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988). 
114 See ATRIA, supra note 100, at 74. 
115 In sociological discourse, deviant cases have overall methodological significance (see, e.g. Patricia 
Kendall and Katherine Wolf, The Analysis of Deviant Cases in Communications Research, in 
LAZARSFELD AND STANTON, COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH, Harper and Bros. (1949). 
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important reason is that it shows that the very idea of what constitutes a hard case is 
relative to our perspective. Perhaps it is not so much that hard cases are rare and 
exceptional occurrences, but that they fall out of our sight or area of interest.  
Once hard cases are brought back from the margins, it is easier to see why Cover 
does not think that the stakes—the what of hard cases—are how to better reinstate the 
lost unity of the legal system, as both Hart and Dworkin agreed, but rather, to face the 
terrible consequences of attempting to do so. Cover argues, against Owen Fiss, that the 
alternative is not between accepting the judicial articulation of values or the looming 
void of nihilism.116 This is a false and too easy dichotomy, according to Cover. Instead, 
“the challenge presented by the absence of a single, ‘objective’ interpretation is … to 
maintain a sense of legal meaning despite the destruction of any pretense to superiority” 
(at 44). In other words, the question is how to create value out of the death (or the 
killing) of law, a question first brought to mind by Nietzsche.117 This brings into legal 
theory matters that are hardly ever put into legal language. In what concerns the role of 
the State as adjudicator of conflict, this is to question “the extent to which coercion is 
necessary to the maintenance of minimum conditions for the creation of meaning” (id.). 
In the sub-section that gives closure to this chapter, we shall see how Cover 
suggests this can be done preserving some sense of justice, or, in the language we have 
learned to use, about the how of hard cases. Before dealing with that issue frontally, 
however, we must first articulate the intersecting point between different normative 
systems.   
 
116 Cover (at 44) refers to Fiss’s Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).  
117 This is the meaning of Nietzsche’s famous aphorism about the death of God. Although this is not the 
place or the time to make the full case, it must be said contrary to popular belief that Nietzsche was no 
nihilist. On the contrary, he aimed at his own (and pushed others to their own) system of values (see 
especially THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, 1892).   
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III. 2. The Hermeneutics of Jurisdiction
In the preceding subsection we have described the judicial office and the courts 
as being jurispathic, but Cover concedes that judges may be also people of peace. 
Indeed, courts may be well suited to perform a regulative function among warring sects 
that commits them to coexistence rather than to mutual destruction (at 53). The way for 
judges to use their authority not as an act of naked violence is, Cover says, through the 
articulation of the institutional privilege of force, that is, jurisdiction (at 54).118 
Jurisdiction, from the latin juris-dictio (jus = law, right; dictio = to say, to proclaim; and 
having roots in the Greek dikA = justice) can be defined as the prerogative to determine 
what falls within a given normative realm and must be decided by it, and what falls 
outside it and ought to be left for others to decide.119 In other words, it is the 
determination not so much of the content but of the boundaries of the legal system.  
Cover speaks of jurisdiction in the context of resistance and confrontation—
examples of hard cases if I may add—because it is in the face of opposition to the law of 
judges by communities who insist upon living their own law that commitments emerge. 
On the one hand, “resistance . . . raises the question of the judge’s commitment to the 
violence of his office,” whereas “[c]onfrontation, on the other hand, challenges the 
judge’s implicit claim to authoritative interpretation” (at 53). It is not that in the rest of 
cases judges have no commitments, but that they become apparent only in the face of 
 
118 “The most basic of the texts of jurisdictions,” says Cover, “are the apologies for the [S]tate itself and 
for its violence” (at 54).   
119 However, insofar as it determines what cannot be decided, every denial of jurisdiction is constitutive 
of a norm (at 8 n. 23). 
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contrary ones. Here again, we see that a hard case situation is revelatory not in and of 
itself, but as it happens, of the experience as a whole.   
With the aim of testing the alignments of the judiciary, Cover proceeds to 
analyze the particular situation of jurisdiction in contemporary America. Thus, he finds 
that when judges are aligned with the State, that is, when they adopt the perspective of 
an insider looking out upon the committed acts of those whose law is other than the 
State’s, legal meaning is subordinated to the interest of public order (at 55). For 
example, he says that a rule such as that of Walker v. City of Birmingham—holding that 
an injunction is to be obeyed (and to be enforced), even though found to be 
incorrect120—allows the judge to be aggressive in confronting private resistance, 
because his authority will be vindicated even if in error (id). Moreover, Cover says, this 
rule puts the resister in a very weak position, because “even were he to convince the 
judge that his interpretation was correct, he would still be punished for his persistent and 
active commitment to it” (at 56). In sum, Cover finds that when the judge sides with the 
power of the State, his authority is made greater than what the Constitution or the law 
would warrant, for “even when wrong, the judge is to act and is entitled to be obeyed” 
(id.).   
In contrast, Cover says, when the judge adopts the role of a potential outsider 
looking at the activities of the State, the situation is just the opposite. Often in the name 
of principles such as separation of powers and political deference, the violence of the 
administration is placed out of the reach of the effective control of courts (at 56). For 
 
120 388 U.S. 307 (1967).  
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example, Cover cites cases such as Rizzo,121 in which the court deemed a given police 
practice illegal but, relying on a principle of deference, rejected the only possible 
equitable remedy. This is, Cover believes, not an isolated practice, but a structural 
allocation of power: “When the question is whether judicial interpretations that 
circumscribe the authority of the wielders of [S]tate violence will be given full effect, 
jurisdictional principles require that judges’ interpretations be given less than their 
intrinsic authority” (at 56, emphasis in the original).122 In sum, when the judge is placed 
as a counterweight to the power of the State, the system sets up mechanisms to 
downplay his jurisgenerative impulse (id.) and to submit it instead to some form of 
hierarchical ordering (at 58).   
From the perspective of legal theory, what is important to retain is not the 
contingent rules of jurisdiction—although it would be interesting to study how 
contingent these rules in fact are—nor the particular commitments of the judiciary in the 
American legal order—although it would also be interesting to ascertain how particular 
these in fact are. The significance of Cover’s analysis lies in showing that jurisdiction, 
more than a set of procedural rules, reveals the backbone of any legal system. 
Considering, on the other hand, that these principles define how the system conceives of 
and exercises authority, the study of jurisdiction can be a good barometer of its 
democratic health: namely, about how it deals with a diverse, plural, and potentially 
conflictive environment.     
 
121 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (denying injunctive relief against practices of the Philadelphia 
police). 
122 As Cover says, “equity is ‘strong’ when the court is aligned with [S]tate violence and ‘weak’ when the 
court is a counterweight to that violence” (at 56). 
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What is then the predicament of current jurisdictional practices as identified by 
Cover? We can distinguish two separate but interrelated sets of issues. The first derives 
from the non-recognition of the plights of jurisdiction, or to put it differently, from not 
taking jurisdiction as a plight. Cover argues that despite the ideological charge implied 
in its determination and the heavy repercussions that derive from it, “[t]he judge rarely 
concedes that these underlying questions are even at issue” (at 54-5).123 Rather, “[t]he 
apologetic and statist orientation of current jurisdictional understandings prevents courts 
from ever reaching the threatening question” (at 56). Under the pretext of applying mere 
technical rules, the judge is thus able to ignore the stakes involved in the adjudication of 
deep or hard normative conflict, or else to expel the issue to some extra-judicial non-
legal limbo. The non-recognition of the plights of jurisdiction allows the judge to 
camouflage inter-systemic adjudication—the killing off of law—and to present this task 
as a more or less difficult maintenance of intra-systemic consistency—the clarification 
of law.  
The second set of problems has to do with the alignment of judges and the 
implications this has for their function in the administration of justice. We have seen 
that as per their current jurisdictional practices, judges are prone to align themselves 
with the state and to put the interests of legal order above the creation of substantive 
legal meaning. This is dangerous because justice is then slanted in favor of “those who 
control the means of violence” (at 57). This leads, Cover believes, to an overall 
 
123 In this they may not be different from other nomos. However, Cover seems to require more self-
consciousness from the State. Cover wants the State not to give up but to live up to its responsibilities. 
This remark will prove to be relevant to what concerns the politics of the perspective (section IV). 
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escalation of brute force,124 which is per se problematic. I would argue it is also 
problematic because it jeopardizes judges’ ability to perform the regulative function that 
could presumably redeem their jurispathic role. As we shall see in a moment, the slanted 
alignment with the State power impedes the formation of the symbolic structure of 
justice.   
 
III. 3. Cover’s Vision of Justice
Cover believes that “the structure of jurisdiction need not have the largely state-
serving implications it generally has today” (at 58). For example, in a situation of 
authoritarian abuse of power, the judge might courageously “defend his own authority to 
sit over those who exercise extralegal violence in the name of the state” (at 59). Indeed, 
in such a situation Cover affirms that nothing is more revolutionary than the judges’ 
insistence on exercising jurisdiction (id). However, the exercise of jurisdiction can be 
justified, says Cover, only insofar as the judge engages in “the articulation of legal 
principle according to an independent hermeneutic” (id). That is also, at the same time, 
the judge’s only hope of partially extricating himself from the violence of his  
office (id).125 
To do the contrary is the much extended practice of judicial helplessness. For 
instance, Cover considers the example of the judge who submits to the rule of a superior 
judge in spite of his believing that it is both morally and legally wrong (at 58). 
According to Cover, such rhetoric of submission rests on the fallacy that judges are not 
 
124 As Cover warns, “[judges] destroy the worlds that might be built upon the law of the communities that 
defer to the superior violence of the state, and they escalate the commitment of those who remain to 
resist” (at 60). 
125 Cover does not expressly explain why, but one can infer that such articulation would at least force the 
judge to explicate his or her own commitments, exposing him or her to criticism. 
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personally responsible for their normative determinations. This is certainly not to deny 
the existence of institutional constraints. Still, the rhetoric of helplessness exaggerates 
the powerlessness of judges, while abetting strategies of occultation.126 In particular, this 
rhetoric conceals that in order for these constraints to be binding the judge must first 
commit to them hence accepting their normative value. All in all, Cover would have 
judges act on an independent hermeneutics that would not defer to the hierarchy of the 
political structures, but would put meaning above it. In his view, this would open the 
way for a more aggressive yet articulate judicial review that would be grounded on the 
judges’ committed constitutionalism (at 57, n. 158, in fine).127 
But would this not just shift the problem to the judiciary? Cover assures us that 
he does not want to belittle the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” that is, the fact that a 
body of non-democratically elected judges may thwart the will of the majority.128 
However, Cover points out that “majoritarianism” ought not to be our only democratic 
concern. First of all, the democratic ascendancy of the elected political branches must 
not be taken for granted. More often than we care to admit, there is but a tenuous 
 
126 Some of these exaggerations are analyzed in his book JUSTICE ACCUSED; see M. Minow, 
Introduction: Robert Cover and Law, Judging, and Violence, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE 
LAW, supra note 15, 1-11, at 2-5.  
127 Cover’s committed constitutionalism does not necessarily entail that judges ought to attend to 
principle to the point of disregarding all other considerations, e.g., prudence. Rather, Cover’s committed 
constitutionalism forces judges to take up the challenges and responsibilities of their decision-making. I 
can see that on occasions accepting this task may lead to putting prudence over principle.   
128 The term was coined by Alexander Bickel in 1962, but according to Cover, counter-majoritarianism 
has been one of shaping factors of American constitutionalism at least since the work of James Thayer 
(The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129; 1893). 
See also Barry Friedman, who defines this issue as an “obsession” [B. Friedman, The Birth of an 
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J. 153 
(2002)]. Cover distinguishes three doctrinal positions: The quietist view, defended by A. BICKEL (THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 1962), and L. HAND (THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1958); the moderate 
view, which justifies judicial action only insofar as it helps the democratic process, L. LUSKY (BY 
WHAT RIGHT?, 1975); J. ELY (DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 1980); and the more active view of 
judges as articulators of fundamental values, defended by M. PERRY (THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1982) and O. Fiss (The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
1979). Cover’s own position is closer to the latter, but it differs in the form that we shall shortly see.   
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relationship between administration and popular politics, whereas “the tie between 
administration and coercive violence is always present” (at 57).129 On the other hand, 
democracy ought not to be assimilated with majoritarianism. Twentieth century politics 
has made painfully clear that popular majority can lead to a tyrannical regime that is 
antithetical to democracy, as well as conducive to the systematic enslavement of whole 
segments of society. At the dawn of this century, democracy has also come to be 
identified with the defense of those values that cannot be frustrated, even in the name of 
the majority.130 It is natural that a healthy political system set up mechanisms to put a 
check on potential abuses committed in its name. Nothing precludes—and in fact there 
are good reasons to support—that such a function could be entrusted to an independent 
judiciary.131 
Indeed, Cover sees the judiciary as a counterweight to the violence of the State. 
According to him, “the more judges use their interpretive acts to oppose the violence of 
the governors, the more nearly they approximate a ‘least dangerous branch’ with neither 
sword nor purse” (p. 57). In this regard, it is true, the authority of judges rests on the 
articulation and quality of their interpretative acts and opinions, which make their nomos 
look more like that of the rest of jurisgenerative communities of the world (p. 57-8). 
However, does this not make judges’ nomos “particular”? If so, why is it important that 
 
129 It is true, however, that the administration may have strong popular support and that the veto exercised 
by a group of unelected judges may appear unjustified. This situation creates “an insoluble conflict 
between principle and process” (at 57). It ought to be said that democracy does not rest only upon 
process, nor is the rule of the majority the only democratic one. 
130 Perhaps, democracy had better be measured not by the level of respect granted to the majority—which 
shows a natural tendency to take care of itself—but by that granted to the minority. 
131 One good reason may be the correlative weakness of the alternative in which the administration and 
the organs of the state monitor themselves. For the view of judicial review as the least intrusive of the 
alternatives in particularly abhorrent and/or structurally unjust political contexts, see Cover, The Origins 
of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, originally 91 YALE L. J. 1287 (1982). In fact, not 
even those who are most suspicious of judicial activism would like to abolish the institution, but rather to 
tame it. See A. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, in 94 YALE L. J. 1567 (1985).  
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they develop an independent hermeneutics? Pursuing these questions will help us finally 
to clarify Cover’s vision of justice. 
It is no secret that Cover accords no privileged position to the work of judges 
and, in that sense, their hermeneutics is in fact particular.132 Yet this does not hinder the 
fulfillment of a more general function which has to do, I believe, with their position in 
the structure of adjudication. As described, on one side there is a normative group; on 
another side, the State; and thirdly, there is the institutional position of the person called 
to adjudicate the conflict. Ideally, the structure of adjudication is constituted by the 
triangulation of these three personal perspectives.133 Together, all three can be said to 
avail the symbolic configuration of justice, which suggests that when any one of these 
personal perspectives is lacking the structure of justice cannot be properly constituted. 
This can be explained. Without the triangulation perfected by the third personal 
perspective, the interactions between the first and the second perspectives are prone to 
fall into patterns of domination and hierarchy, especially when the power of both is as 
disproportionate as that which obtains between smallish communities and the state. This 
is one of the reasons why, I argued previously, the court ought not to align itself with the 
State. Therefore, the importance of judges developing their own normative 
determination (without collapsing into that of the State) lies not so much in the 
particular narrative they happen to articulate, but in that doing so they facilitate the 
symbolic triangulation of justice. In other words, judges’ hermeneutic is important not 
 
132 In fact, this is what sets Cover apart from other theorists who advocate aggressive judicial review (see 
Cover, at 57 n.158, referring to the work of M. Perry and O. Fiss, supra note 128.  
133 The first personal perspective is that of the nomoi when considered from within; the second personal 
perspective requires a plurality of nomoi where each adopts the perspective of the other looking in. The 
third personal perspective is constituted by whoever occupies the position of adjudicator, when he or she 
1) articulates an independent hermeneutic, that 2) justifies the jurisdictional role; and 3) does not collapse 
upon either the first or the second personal perspectives. 
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in and of itself—although the articulation of legal meaning is always an enrichment of 
the nomos—but as an enabler of the said configuration. This interpretation is supported 
a sensu contrario when we realize that Cover would have judges act on the basis of such 
committed constitutionalism only when there is a plurality of groups ready and capable 
of opposing it (at 57 n. 158 in fine). In other words, the judges’ “aggressiveness” is 
justified as long as it does not stifle one of the necessary cornerstones of justice. This is, 
in my view, the subtle yet crucial point separating Cover’s defense of judicial review 
from other standard forms of the argument.134 In Cover’s normative cosmos balance is 
assured not through meaning or hierarchy, but through meanings and hierarchies (i.e., 
perspectives) that keep each other at bay. 
How well does this particular vision translate into a real case scenario? Let me 
answer this question in connection to Cover’s analysis of Bob Jones University.135 
Formally, the case was about taxes, namely about the decision of the IRS to deny tax-
exempt status to Bob Jones University on account of its racist policies. On a deeper 
level, however, the case presented serious constitutional issues, and confronted the 
school’s claim for nomic insularity and liberty of education with the converse interest of 
ensuring the eradication of racism and discriminatory practices from schools. 
Ultimately, the case raises questions about the character, purposes, and principles of the 
paideia that ought to constitute the world of children, as is often the case in disputes 
over educational issues.136 
134 See supra note 128. 
135 Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). 
136 Education is a particularly sensitive (and controversial) issue because it is the point of entry into the 
nomos and ensures the generation of the social bonds that ground it. Precisely for this reason, says Cover, 
education is the target of any redemptive constitutional ideology that would want antagonistic abhorrent 
practices eradicated from schools altogether (see at 66).  
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The school’s claim for educational insularity, Cover explains, was well-
grounded in constitutional precedent. Its position was strengthened on the other hand by 
the danger associated with the imposition of a single statist paideia. However, the 
State’s interest in eradicating racial discrimination was equally compelling. Indeed, it 
connected with America’s long struggle for racial equality and desegregation in schools. 
Faced with such a conflict, the court had to decide which of the competing claims (the 
school’s claim for autonomy versus the State’s claim for redemption) was to be given 
primacy. The problem is that while the insular community (the school) is content with 
being let alone, the redemptive (anti-racist) narrative cannot tolerate this and requires 
the assistance of the organs of the State to eliminate these racist practices. In this last 
regard, the court must either deny the redemptive narrative or share their interpretation, 
that is, it “cannot avoid responsibility for applying or refusing to apply power to fulfill a 
redemptionist vision” (at 60).  
In the case at hand, the Supreme Court upheld the determination of the IRS and 
ruled against Bob Jones University. Although Cover is no racist sympathizer, he 
reprimands the court for not having adequately responded to the challenges presented by 
the case. In particular, he stresses that the court did not articulate a redemptive narrative 
in which the school’s racist practices would be left “without foundation in law.”137 
Rather, in characteristic uncommitted fashion, the court argued that denying tax-exempt 
status to Bob Jones fell within the authority of the IRS and therefore was not 
unconstitutional. This rationale appears problematic for several concurrent reasons: first, 
by not acknowledging what was really at stake, the court did not own up to its 
responsibility for killing off the law, and instead hid behind the law; second, without the 
 
137 At 38, referring to Douglass’ antislavery constitutional vision.  
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articulation of a redemptive “constitutional commitment to avoiding public 
subsidization of racism,” the grand travail against discrimination and the struggle for 
racial equality are given “no normative status” (at 66-7); third, by aligning with the 
power of the state without contributing a bit to the enrichment of its nomos (at 66), not 
only did the court put hierarchy above legal meaning, but it was prevented from 
constituting itself as an enabler of the structure of justice; and fourth, because in its 
absence, the school was left at the mercy of power relations or, as Cover says, at the 
mercy of whatever public policy the administration happens to have (at 66). 
In sum, under the sign of judicial restraint the opinion poses more of a general 
threat to the communities which, Cover assures us, “deserved better” (at 67). This 
sounds paradoxical: How can it be that “quietism” poses more of a threat than 
“aggressive” judicial review? More paradoxical still, how can this be better not from the 
perspective of the State, but from that of the groups affected negatively by the decision? 
One could argue, perhaps, that when a legal case is submitted to adjudication, no one 
can legitimately expect to be declared to be right, yet one can at least expect to be 
treated right. And as far as Bob Jones University is concerned, this the court did not do. 
Yet, Cover seems to be saying more than that: he seems to suggest that, had the court 
articulated such a redemptive narrative, the insular community would have been not 
only treated better, but simply better off. I think this is one of Cover’s most enigmatic as 
well as interesting suggestions, the clarification of which can shed valuable light on his 
whole vision of law. The argument requires some reconstructive effort, but I trust it can 
be legitimately inferred from the analysis. As I interpret it, had the Court created a 
redemptive narrative against the racist practices of Bob Jones University, the latter 
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would still have to generate a second hermeneutic to respond to such a challenge. Thus, 
it would still have the chance to reconstitute its own nomos from within, attending only 
to the reality of an external imposition of precept. In any event, the primacy of its nomos 
as well as of its jurisgenerative principle would not have been put at risk, nor doubted. 
In my view, this explains that “a redemptive claim would pose no general threat to the 
insular community . . . save the kind of commitment that goes with the articulation of 
the constitutional mandate” (at 66). In spite of being affected negatively by the decision, 
the leading forces of their nomos would have been preserved. Perhaps even an 
enrichment of the whole normative cosmos would have ensued, for the continued 
production of legal meaning is “an enrichment of social life” (at 68). 
Clearly, Cover’s vision of the legal cosmos and justice contrasts heavily with the 
hierarchical and one-dimensional image we gather from the top of the legal pyramid;138 
but it also differs, perhaps in smaller measure, from the two-way vision projected by 
dialogical and communicative theories.139 We could say that Cover entertains three 
dimensions: first, the personal perspective of the self-legitimating and internally 
validating nomos; second, the level of their mutual interactions, conceptualized more in 
confrontational than in cooperative fashion (be they insular or redemptive); and third, 
the triadic order constituted by the context of adjudication. Such multilayered vision 
requires both critics and observers to pay attention to more than one dimension at once, 
which may even have repercussions on our methods of analysis. On the first level, it will 
 
138 The most conspicuous advocate of the pyramid of law is, no doubt, Hans Kelsen, but the image can be 
traced back, perhaps, to Austin and Bentham, and continues mostly unchanged with Hart and beyond, in 
the imagination of most lawyers and legal theorists (see supra note 43). For a truly lucid criticism of the 
pyramid of law and its substitution for images that reflect the new era of mutual interconnectedness, see 
OST and VAN DE KERCHOVE, supra note 44.   
139 See Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of 
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1109 (2006).  
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likely have to be enriched by a comparative and an empathetic hermeneutics, especially 
when the narratives, beliefs, and myths contained in the nomos are not our own. On the 
second, it will have to be attentive to the rhetoric as well as to the pragmatics of their 
mutual interactions. And on the third, it will have to integrate institutional and self-
reflective considerations. At any rate, the critic must deploy the ability to shift from one 
perspective to the other and to discern the appropriate level of analysis at each time. No 
doubt, Cover makes the work of lawyers, judges, scholars, critics, and commentators 
much more difficult, yet at the same time, all the more interesting.  
 
IV. THE POLITICS OF PERSPECTIVE: LIBERALISM AND VIOLENCE  
In this last section we must confront the political outlook that can be inferred 
from Cover’s singular vision. In particular, one must grapple with the problem of law’s 
violence, which is but another way to inquire about Cover’s relationship with liberalism. 
In order to do so, I will follow more closely than in other sections the trail of other 
scholars and Cover’s other writings.   
Cover has depicted a legal cosmos that is no longer unitary but plural, and in 
which legal meaning is essentially contested. The existence of conflict then appears 
unavoidable, especially when noticed that the worlds we all create are partly redemptive 
and mutually exclusive. In this context, Cover argues that the structure of jurisdiction 
locates the responsibility for decision-making upon the courts as a matter of statist 
positive law (n. 166 and accompanying text). However, once the radical autonomy of 
juridical meaning and of jurisgenesis is accepted, why ought one to conform to statist 
law? If, in reality, courts are allocated the jurisdictional function, could not this be 
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questioned at least as vision?140 And if Cover does not question it—nor does he offer a 
reason other than state law not to do so—could it be that he takes the framework and 
political structure of the liberal state for granted, without acknowledging his debt? 
This is one of the criticisms that emanates from Robert Post’s critical assessment 
of Cover.141 Post sees Cover’s work as antedating the theorization of public reason and 
the so-called “republican revival.”142 According to him, Cover remains uninterested in 
the possibilities of constitutional politics and reduces the normative capabilities of the 
state to its bare minimum. However, the life of the communities Cover finds so 
appealing seems to depend, considers Post, on the existence of the framework of the 
liberal State. This implies, then, that liberalism must be accorded a sort of logical 
priority that Cover is unwilling to recognize. Post argues against Cover that most recent 
work in public law departs from completely different premises: namely, it begins with 
the idea that the State can express the nomoi of its population and forge a notion of 
“common will” through public discussion and dialogue. In addition, it is not afraid of 
the work of courts, because it regards the judiciary as voicing narratives in which one 
might also believe. In sum, Post espouses a more dialogical vision of law that 
acknowledges that the state performs violence, but relegates it to the extremis.  
Post’s criticism deserves a more extensive consideration that what I am able to 
give it here. Yet, I hope to have shown already that Cover does not want the State to shy 
 
140 For a compelling argument questioning this in cases of incommensurability, see S. VEITCH, MORAL 
CONFLICT AND LEGAL REASONING, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland (1999). 
141 R. Post, Who is afraid, supra note 3.  
142 For the theorization of public reason, one thinks especially of the well-known works of John Rawls 
and Jürgen Habermas. For the “republican revival,” see Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, in 
97 YALE L. J. (1988). F. Michelman, one of the leading theorists in the republican revival who uses 
some of Cover’s key concepts such as that of jurisgenesis [Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493 (1988)], 
sees his work as “extending but not deepening” that of Cover (ref. in Kahn, supra note 5, at 28. n. 120).   
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away from, but on the contrary, to live up to its responsibilities.143 Nor do I think that 
Cover is hostile, but in fact begs for a well-articulated theory of participative 
democracy.144 Now, I want to focus instead on Cover’s particular relationship with 
liberalism, for what it may reveal of the politics or perspective he urges us to adopt. The 
charge seems to be that Cover is insufficiently liberal for, on the one hand, he does not 
recognize the primacy that the liberal state attains towards the preservation of the 
paideic communities; and, on the other hand, focuses too much on the violence and 
coercion of the State, which does not reflect the everyday workings of it.145 
To respond to this charge one must begin by saying that it is simply not true that 
the liberal state is “necessary” for the life of the communities, either in Cover’s theory, 
or as a matter of historical development. Indeed, one of Cover’s most forceful 
arguments is in fact that the existence of the paideic communities does not depend upon, 
nor is logically connected to, what the State does or does not do. Certainly none of the 
communities mentioned by Cover (Amish, Mennonites, or the Jewish religious 
communities) had to wait for the liberal state to live their law; and one could surely find 
 
143 I agree with Judith Resnik (supra note 8 at 26) when she says that Cover seems fascinated by the 
interactions between state and paideic communities. 
144 Post may be right in that Cover does not develop a theory of public reason. However, if he does not 
develop it (at least to the satisfaction of Post), he most definitely points out the challenges that such a 
theory would have to overcome (at 48-9). According to Cover, attacking the problem of law’s violence by 
constitutionalizing the principles of an uncoerced politics, based on the ideas of free speech and 
decentralization of power, may be praiseworthy, but not entirely successful: first, because speech requires 
the correlative power to act upon it, and this cannot be guaranteed without allocating power upon groups 
(not just individuals) that want to live (not only speak) their law; on the other hand, Cover believes that 
the image of the modern state as the agora for political discussion is imbued with a romantic ideal that 
does not hold true in the modern State. The contemporary State is no longer a community of common 
myths and narratives, nor can it aspire to become one. It seems to me that it is up to Post to demonstrate 
that modern theories of deliberative democracy are able to overcome the specific difficulties identified by 
Cover. At any rate, to say as Post does (supra note 3 at 15) that courts may “voice narratives in which we 
believe,” or that “the State can express the nomoi of its population” does not do much to dispel the charge 
of romanticism. For a through and systematic appraisal of modern theories of constitutional dialogue, 
including that of Post, see Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise, supra note 139. 
145 A similar charge can be found in R. Sherwin, supra note 6. 
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a historian ready to argue that many normative sub-communities thrived within the 
Roman Empire, which is not to say that imperial Rome was liberalism in disguise. 
Moreover, liberal theory often finds itself at odds with the idea of collective rights, as 
well as with conceiving a normative space for discrete nomic entities between the 
individual and the State. All these reasons suggest that Cover’s conception of the nomos 
and the framework of the liberal state do not necessitate each other. 
The second charge concerns Cover’s insistence on conflict and violence, rather 
than on dialogue and consensus. Post admits that, to be sure, the State expresses its own 
parochialism and forms of violence, but argues that this is true only as a boundary 
condition. By now, it must be clear that concepts such as core and boundary, central and 
marginal, extreme and everyday, are evaluative, and depend not on statistics but on 
judgment. This is why, in the wake of the so-called global war on terror—with 
frightening revelations of practices of, and legal memos about, torture, secret centers of 
detentions, denial of International covenants to detainees, and general programs of 
eavesdropping without a warrant, not to mention the specious grounds for an 
unprecedented pre-emptive war—it is disingenuous, to say the least, to think that 
Cover’s warnings about the coercion and violence of the state are marginal, or have 
been left behind.146 In my opinion, stressing the conflictive (and sometimes violent) 
nature of many social interactions is not to deny the possibility for argument and reason, 
but to contextualize them. In contrast, many theories that privilege consensus have a 
tendency to view disagreement as an intermediate step towards a final perfect 
equilibrium. As Isaiah Berlin would say, conflict then becomes merely a nuisance, or a 
 
146 Post ends up by saying that in the face of the “shocking arrogance and rampant intolerance of those 
who presently dominate America … Cover may have seen more deeply than I care to acknowledge” 
(supra note 3 at 16). Yet this seems to me just a rhetorical concession. 
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bother to be eliminated, instead of a potential source of enrichment and vitality.147 All in 
all, it seems to me that Cover’s perspective does not close but opens the door to 
democracy.   
If Post criticizes Cover for being insufficiently liberal, Austin Sarat and Thomas 
Kearns accuse him of the contrary.148 According to them, Cover was caught up in one of 
the central dichotomies of liberal political thought, that between order and freedom.149 
Because he could not free himself from this dichotomy, he reconciled himself (albeit 
tragically) to law’s violence.150 He did so by first imagining a world of freedom, 
diversity, and meaning, and then embracing, albeit reluctantly, the necessity of the 
ordering force of law. As they read it, freedom is exemplified in the meaning-generating 
activity of the communities and associations that form the nomos, which is the task of 
the law to promote and tolerate. However, if let loose and unfettered, Cover seems to 
fear that the worlds created would be unstable and sectarian. This is when, in order to 
manage all this unruliness, the ordering force of law becomes necessary, and meaning 
gives way to discipline. Thus, when one would expect the rejection of violence and a 
vision of law without force or coercion, the self-proclaimed anarchist151 legitimates the 
external imposition of force. In other words, Cover imaginatively tames and makes 
 
147 I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 1969 [there is a new edition incorporating Berlin’s four 
original essays plus another one—hence making it Five Essays on Liberty—just as Berlin had originally 
devised; see the editor’s note in LIBERTY, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford and New York (2002)]. 
148 The charge is one of being a “reluctant liberal”; see A. SARAT & T. R. KEARNS, supra note 6. A 
shorter version is to be found in A. Sarat, Robert Cover on Law and Violence, in NARRATIVE, 
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra note 15, 255-65. For convenience, I shall draw from both 
interchangeably.  
149 A similar point is made by P. Kahn, supra note 5 at 62, arguing that Cover finds a dichotomy between 
meaning and authority.   
150 However, they also recognize that “Cover was able to rescue the phrase ‘legal violence’ from the 
status of near-oxymoron and almost single-handedly reverse received assumptions regarding law and its 
own violence” (supra note 6 at 222).  
151 In his article Folktales of Justice, originally 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179 (1984-85) [hereinafter 
Folktales], Cover defined the position staked out in Nomos and Narrative as being close to a classical 
anarchist one, understanding anarchism to mean the absence of rulers, not of rules (at 181). 
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peace with violence without paying any price for it. This, Sarat and Kearns defend, no 
amount of theoretical ingenuity can do. For this reason, they conclude, Cover’s vision 
becomes another liberal apology for law and its reliance on force.   
Again, more than what I can argue here is required to respond to this criticism. I 
ought to begin by saying that what distinguishes the nomic groups from the State is not 
the absence of violence in the former, but the lack of state machinery to back it up. 
Hence, the found dichotomy between nomos and State does not fit neatly into that 
between freedom and order. As we saw, Cover believes that the sustainable growth of 
every nomos necessitates the activity of two opposite generative impulses: one 
expansive, the other contractive, which are both necessary for a healthy body politic.152 
Cover argues explicitly that without some form of ordering principle—a sort of 
principle of systemic stabilization—the very subsistence of the nomos would be in 
peril.153 Therefore, “order” ought not to be straightforwardly assimilated with the 
external imposition of (State) coercion, for it is also the result of the internal 
configuration of the nomos or, to put it differently, part of a nomos that regulates 
itself.154 
On the other hand, Cover deals with violence—to say that he “embraces” it 
seems an exaggeration—as an inescapable element not just of law but of life. Indeed, 
 
152 For the full argument, see supra section II.2. See, however P. Kahn, supra note 5, considering that “[a] 
choice must be made… between the anarchy of meaning and the politics of violence” (at 62, footnote 
omitted).     
153 Cover explains that “[t]he unity of every paideia is being shattered … in fact, by its very creation” (at 
16). And continues, “[t]hus, as the meaning in a nomos disintegrates, we seek to rescue it—to maintain 
some coherence in the awesome proliferation of meaning lost as it is created—by unleashing upon the 
fertile but weakly organized jurisgenerative cells an organizing principle” (id.) 
154 To be sure, “order” can also be imposed from the outside, but it is the very subsistence of the nomos—
and correlative instability of a nomos that would function exclusively as jurisgenerative impulse—which 
requires it, not the order of the (liberal) world. See, however, P. Kahn, arguing that the “constraint on this 
potential anarchy of jurisgenesis must come from outside … [because] authority is simply not built into 
the structure of the nomos” (Kahn, supra note 5 at 60).   
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Cover forces us to face both that law takes place in a violent world, and that it is 
sometimes itself violent. On the contrary, to think that one can articulate a “vision of law 
without coercion or violence” is utopian, I would say, in the sense that one can merely 
dismiss it.155 This is not, in my view, to make peace with violence, for violence is, 
Cover tells us, always “problematic.”156 This is why Cover urges judges not to succumb 
to the bureaucratic and hierarchical violence of their office, and that they begin to 
tolerate the richness of diverse normative worlds. However, collision is sometimes 
unavoidable and violence will happen. In these cases, adjudicators ought at least to be 
cognizant of and acknowledge that they are exercising violence. Further, they ought to 
articulate an independent hermeneutics to set up the conditions, restrictions, and the 
alleged redemptive value that its exercise is supposed to bring forward. And all this 
ought to be accomplished without flattening the triadic structure of justice. From here, a 
distinction can be drawn between bureaucratic (mechanical, hierarchical, blind, and 
systematic) and hermeneutic (articulate, horizontal, self-conscious, and individualized) 
forms of violence.157 This is not to say that violence is legitimated by the principle upon 
which it is based.158 I agree with Sarat and Kearns that it would be dangerous if the 
argument were that violence disappears, or is magically inoculated along with the 
justification of those principles. But this does not seem to be Cover’s contention. Rather, 
he insists that the function of courts—at least when confronting mutually exclusive 
 
155 Paraphrasing Cover, at 44. Cover also refers to a world without violence as an “imaginary world” 
(at 40). 
156 See Cover, Folktales, supra note 150, at 182. Also Nomos and Narrative, supra note 2 at 25. 
157 A third possible form of violence is the pure and simple, naked and indiscriminate abuse of force, 
which does not even pretend to be integrated within any justificatory scheme.  
158 This is the view that SARAT AND KEARNS (supra note 6 at 214) associate with Ronald Dworkin. 
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nomoi—is inherently jurispathic.159 Thus, no matter how well articulated a (violent) 
decision of the judge may be, it will still be suffered as violent. To say it clearly, 
violence exists before the law, and it will continue to exist after the law. 
This leads us to an important, and perhaps the most significant, point concerning 
violence and its assessment. The critical realization here is to face the intellectually 
unbridgeable gap that exists between the experience of exercising violence, and that of 
suffering it.160 The person who does violence may think that he or she is legitimated to 
act in such a way, but the one suffering it is not likely to feel the same. Consequently, 
the appraisal of violence ought never to rely upon a single (and above all systematically 
the same) point of view. If we are to be sensitive at all it is required, especially from 
those of us who comment on the violence of the wielders of the State and law, that we 
do not downplay, ignore, or silence the perspective of those who suffer violence. In the 
normative world that Cover urges us to inhabit, no one can be denied a priori the 
privilege of a point of view.161 
The fact remains that the state is reserved a prominent place within Cover’s 
theory of law. The interesting issue is not, however, whether he does or does not accept 
the liberal state, but what kind of acceptance this is. In my view this “acceptance” stems 
out of Cover’s acute sense of realism. Just like living in the economic world entails 
 
159 Save in those few cases in which they are able to carry out a regulative function among warring sects 
(Cover, at 53, and supra section III.2.). 
160 This argument is developed in Violence and the Word, supra note 15 at 1602-3, in particular as it 
concerns the practice of torture.  
161 Could it not be that Cover’s insistence of being fair to all perspectives already embodies an important 
liberal ideal? The question is not trivial, but it is overstated. Treating all persons as centers of meaning is 
an important liberal principle that has its philosophical statement in Kant’s realm of ends, but as James 
Boyd White argues, in one form of another it can be found in many religions and traced back even to the 
Greeks (see Heracles’ Bow: Persuasion and Community in Sophocles’ “Philoctetes”, in HERACLES’ 
BOW: ESSAY ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW, The University of Wisconsin Press  
(1985); see also his chapter on the Iliad, the “fundamental value [of which] is its recognition of the equal 
humanity of those who must die” (in WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 49, at 53). 
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being cognizant of price (at 53), his understanding of the normative world leads him to 
treat the State as a reality to be reckoned with. In this, he is like the nomic groups which 
find themselves within a state that they do not control (at 31) and whose law they even 
denounce as void (at 43), yet who concede the superior practical effects of securing the 
acquiescence of its organs (id). This attitude is already observed in his very first 
paragraph, in which he acknowledges the importance of the formal institutions of law 
and social order, yet denies—of which the rest of the article is a demonstration—that 
they alone ought to claim the attention of legal scholars. Realism aside, clearly a more 
positive outlook emanates from the suggestion that courts may fulfill a regulative 
function among warring sects that permits a life of law, rather than violence (at 53). 
Again, can this be interpreted as an apology for the liberal state? Not necessarily. First, 
because even if courts are said to fulfill a pacifying function, keeping the peace is never 
a neutral task (at 60). That is, liberal principles are not pre-political or procedural in the 
sense that many a liberal theory would have them. And second, because in no way does 
this more positive role of judges entail that their narrative ought to be privileged or 
credited with a plus of legitimacy. If judges may help to replace the world of violence 
with that of law, that is, I submit, because they may help to constitute the symbolical 
triangulation of justice, and thus to overcome the bilateral structures of domination in 
which violence operates (e.g., the master-slave dialectic). Still, that is possible if, and 
only if, judges extricate themselves from (the violence of) the State and act according to 
an independent hermeneutics, which needs to oppose any “apologetic” alignment.   
In conclusion, one could perhaps argue that Cover is a liberal and not an 
anarchist, when compared with the extremist forms of the latter. Still, if liberal, his 
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liberalism is infused with the tragic character we may find in the writings of Isaiah 
Berlin, but with less of an individualistic character than Berlin.162 Indeed, Cover thinks 
that the community and not the individual is the basic unit of normative life. In this, one 
may be reminded of Karl von Savigny’s insistence that the true source of law is in a 
community’s volksgeist. But I would argue that Cover’s view of community(ies) and 
their law (nomos) is not infused with the same romanticism that animated Savigny.163 
Cover does not delude himself into thinking that smallish communities are ideal, except 
perhaps insofar as its members are able to imagine or to fictionalize it.164 Moreover, the 
social environment in which these nomoi live is often cruel and inhospitable. Yet, it is 
not the brutal, bleak, and treacherous one of Hobbes or Machiavelli. And certainly it 
does not justify transferring all the authority to a Leviathan or to a Princeps. Cover 
believes that power is better counteracted by a power (or powers) working in the other 
direction, which requires a polynomial body politic and a multi-focal perspective. On 
the other hand, human nature is such in Cover’s view that individuals are endowed with 
an immense potential for creativity, solidarity, and mutual understanding. Nevertheless, 
he does not contemplate a society based upon an overlapping consensus such as John 
Rawls’; nor is he espousing, on the other hand, an anti-foundational, yet asserting 
liberalism, such as Richard Rorty’s. Neither is his panoptic vision of violence enchained 
to the pessimistic and inevitable conclusions of a Foucault. If anything, Cover is a 
 
162 Cf. S. VEITCH, supra note 140, chapter 3 (arguing for the social dimension of Berlin’s liberalism).  
163 For a provocative yet well argued re-evaluation of Von Savigny as instrumental in the scientificism 
and subsequent positivization of law, see R. Berkowitz, From Reason to History: Savigny’s System and 
the Rise of Social Legal Science, in his book THE GIFT OF SCIENCE: LEIBNIZ AND THE MODERN 
LEGAL TRADITION, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge and London (2005), 103-136.   
164 As I already argued, this fiction is sometimes maintained only as a convenient façade towards the 
outside world and, it is often exaggerated for rhetorical purposes. See however, Sherwin, supra note 6, 
arguing that Cover offers a romanticized or “purified” view of the narratives that inspire the resistance of 
the communities. 
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paradoxical liberal thinker. But again, why should we dress him with clothes he was not 
comfortable wearing? Why not simply respect his wishes to be called an anarchist who 
loved the law, yet aimed at a radical relativization of it?165 This is one way to understand 
the enigmatic poem of Wallace Stevens that opens Nomos and Narrative: for within a 
law radically relativized a violent order is a disorder, and a great disorder is an order.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
I hope that by now the originality and breadth of Cover’s jurisprudence has been 
more than established. An outline of its most salient features will serve as reminder. 
First, we have seen the depth of his understanding of the nomos. In order to comprehend 
it one must engage not only with the body of precept, but also with the language that 
avails normative activity and the mythos that ground the community in history and in 
relation to the social and natural worlds. Without deepened understanding of these, for 
instance, one could not understand the charge of many contemporary socio-legal 
debates. Among the sources that provide the nomos with a rich sustenance for normative 
life, narrative is of particular significance. Narrative opens up the gate to a third 
ontological existence of norms, and suggestively, allows us to traverse from the plain 
world of fact (is), to the normative world of value (ought). 
We have also lingered on the idea that Cover’s model suggests a malleable and 
not a pyramidal structure, which overcomes crucial shortcomings associated with the 
pyramid. Significantly, the identification of what counts as law depends not upon a fixed 
rule or set of rules (of recognition and habilitation), but on the shifting communal grasp 
and articulation of relevance. This entails that anything can become part of the nomos at 
 
165 Cover, Folktales, supra 151 at 181-2. 
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a given point, but not that everything counts at all times. In other words, although every 
object is liable to fall under the normative influence of the juridical field, not everything 
actually does. Yet the nomos is not a pure mental construct: it exists within a broader 
spectrum of socio-political forces, actors, and constraints. Indeed, law is anchored in 
social reality which incidentally, Cover suggests, may separate it from morality. 
Still, law is made up also of subjective engagements. Cover has helped us to 
explain that normativity is constructed through simultaneous commitment and 
objectification, engagement and disengagement. As described, the formation of legal 
meaning is cyclical and unstoppable, and the stability achieved at a given point is 
susceptible to being destabilized when legal commitments are once again interrogated, 
most clearly, in the face of contrary commitments of others. This process goes in two 
directions at once: in one direction, the provision is interpreted as a demand that requires 
commitment before becoming a norm; in the opposite one, the norm is objectified as a 
precept to which one owes obedience as law. This process assures that the same legal 
code will generate multiple further integrations. By the same token, it also opens the 
possibility of alternative normative worlds. 
 We have also seen the different forces that impinge on the nomos from within 
(paideic/imperial) and how each nomos generates distinctive responses to its 
environment (insular/ redemptive). As to the former, the analysis has shown that the 
vital issue has to do with the systematic repression of one of the generative forces, 
which brings the whole social body to a halt. As to the latter, it was stressed that, despite 
the label, no insular group can manage a total break with the exterior, and additionally, 
that every nomos is partly redemptive. This suggests the interdependence of whole 
83
segments of normative life, such as the activity of constitutional meaning-creation in 
which all groups seem to be engaged, in one way or another.  
The inevitable encounters and clashes between disparate nomoi call for 
mechanisms of conflict resolution that are respectful of all the parties and mindful of the 
stakes involved. Cover delineates an insightful and comprehensive framework to 
understand the when, why, what, and how of hard cases. Considering that each nomos 
sees itself as the Archimedean point, the fundamental question is not how better to 
restore the unity of the legal system, but how to face the dangers of attempting to do so; 
in other words, the issue is how to preserve a sense of meaning in spite of the inability to 
ground the killing of law in the pretense of an objective (and superior) hermeneutics. 
According to Cover, adjudicators ought not to surrender, behind strategies of 
occultation, their responsibility for articulating an independent hermeneutic. Neither 
ought they to rely as a matter of course upon the institutional prerogative of jurisdiction.  
 However, a committed and articulate hermeneutic (including the elaboration of 
jurisdiction) is only the first cornerstone of justice. For its proper configuration, I have 
argued, it is necessarily the symbolic triangulation between the first, the second, and the 
third personal perspectives. Interestingly, Cover does not want to deprive particular 
narratives of their singularity, as do most liberal theories of justice. Rather, Cover’s 
vision requires preserving the tension between mutually effecting narratives, each of 
which could speak and act as they see fit in the face of contrary ones. From here a 
methodological principle seems to derive. According to this, adjudicators and critics 
alike ought to observe an attitude not of impartiality and neutrality, but one we may call 
concerned reflexivity, characterized by a predisposition to shift from one personal 
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perspective to the next, while retaining the critical ability to reflect upon one’s own 
momentary position.  
Finally, I have suggested that although Cover does not provide a theory of 
participative democracy, he is not inimical to it, and in fact offers some pointers as to 
what obstacles any such theory should overcome. Among these, he mentions the 
necessity of empowering social actors, and the need to de-romanticize ideas of public 
forums as agoras of free exchange. Cover views social interactions as inherently 
conflictive, which disowns the idea of the public space based on agreed upon conditions 
or universal criteria for valid argument. Rather, Cover demands not merely a liberal 
apology of the modern state, but a realistic vision for its betterment. If, in this world of 
violence in which we move and among the words of violence it commands, a new 
paradigm is to emerge, this will have to be not discursive and dialogic, but tragic. Yet 
this is already the topic for another chapter… 
